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Foreword
“Tell me and I will forget.
Show me and I will remember.
Involve me and I will understand.
Step back and I will act.”
Chinese Proverb
How do humans intuitively tell the difference between the weights of two objects, e.g. a Rubick’s
Cube, but their shape, colour and materials differ. I conducted this small ad hoc experiment in
several locations, and also during my talk at the MEi:CogSci Conference 2010. It’s very interesting
to see how similarmost people try to solve it. But first, we’ll have a look at somepossible hypotheses:
A researcher believing in classical AI will (should?) suspect, that humans perform a complicated
form of object recognition, scale detection, assessment of probable material type, remembering it’s
specific density and then inferring each object’s weight, compare it, and declare the truth value of
the utterance “the cube is bigger than the ball” (or vice versa). After all, a picture of the two objects
in question tells you everything you need to know, doesn’t it? Of course, there is a host of problems
with this analytic approach, namely that it presupposes a vast and very specific knowledge base to
infer the appropriate information from (for simply deciding on the weight of something!). It is also
prone to small deviations and errors propagating through the logic inference. In light of this, one
should easily see that this can hardly be a sensible description of what a human intuitively would
do.
A typical practical engineering approach, on the other hand, would postulate ameasuring device for
the objects with a weight sensor (we generously assume the armmuscles and proprioceptive sensor
system to resemble such aweightmeasurement device), and then computing the difference between
themeasured weights. According to a decision table, the engineer concludes then, whether the first
object “is heavier”, “lighter” or “roughly the same”. Unfortunately, such an approach has a lot of
flaws too, such as unreliable sensor data and especially the need for a dedicated, single-purpose
device (and perhaps the need of a miraculous or evolutionary explanation for its very existence).
This is the description of a dedicated special-purpose machine, but definitely not one of flexible
human behaviour.
What usually happens when one gives people such a riddle to solve, is that they take the two objects
into each hand and start moving them around, to get a feel for the weight difference.
They instantly start to perturb their environment (apply a certain force or acceleration pattern
to the object), that gives them additional feedback for an increased accuracy of their judgement.
This action is neither done consciously, nor is it planned. It is the skilled use of the arms and
the accompanying sensor and motor circuits in the brain, that provide the illusion of an immediate
access to the weights of the objects. There is no need for a complex planning process for a skilled
task. Access to proximal features and process parameters of the environment are transparent. The
7
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weight in the hand is directly accessible, as if there was no complex system of motor cortex, spinal
circuits, nerve fibres, muscles, tendons and arm kinematics in between.
How come we can access our bodies so easily? Why are all the sophisticated dynamics of the body
transparent during performance of actions? What is the difference between using one’s hand and
using pliers? Is there any?
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Introduction
This thesis tries to derive principles for an autonomous cognitive apparatus (being a physical part of
an agent), to facilitate transparent access to features of the agent’s physical body and environment.
It regards action and observation to be aspects of fundamentally the same process that enables an
agent to define its body. This process is shaped not only by the brain, but also by the sensorimotor
contingencies of the somewhat arbitrary, “attached” environment.
This work also honors the agent’s agency. By their very definition, they can act deliberately. Their
actions are not necessarily predetermined by the environment, as supposed by Behaviourism. The
prevalent view nowadays still is the one of the agent being like a clockwork (an algorithm) perform-
ing a certain computation according to some externally defined (e.g. evolutionary) goals. These
oxymoronic “reactive agents” (reacting to environmental stimuli alone) already lost their agency by
definition. Luckily though, this paradigm is being replaced in some research for an interactivist and
Embodied Cognition perspective, where an agent can define itself by creating action opportunities,
and being spread out over parts of the physical world (i.e. the embodiment of cognition), instead of
being a separate mechanism.
A central part of this thesis is the understanding of the brain’s environment in terms of sensorimotor
contingencies. Much like the nature of a dynamical process is primarily defined by its fix points (at-
tractors), the brain’s environment can be described by its sensor invariances and contingencieswith
respect to effected action patterns, as proposed by David Philipona and Kevin O’Regan (Philipona
et al. , 2003). These contingencies induce surfaces (subspaces) in the action-sensation space, and the
agent can learn to deliberately move on these surfaces. These learnt surfaces of full control enable
the agent to enact it’s own laws and ideas there, much like using those surfaces as a scratch board
to drool upon. We depart from the notion of a purely passive observer to an active agent changing
it’s environment.
Many ideas and explanations are formulated using a paradigm different to the one usually used in
the hard sciences. Borrowing from philosophical Constructivism, some arguments are elaborated
from an agent’s point of view. This first person perspective can sensibly complement the usual, object-
ive third person perspective of hard sciences (like Computer Science, or Psychology) in cases, where
it is rendered incapable due to a self-referential observer. This is the case when the supposedly
independent observer is the observed subject itself.
In the practical part, the theoretically derived model is put to the test in a series of exploratory
simulations. Starting point are two well understood problems of Computer Science (Classification
and Action Selection). Step by step, the models for the cognitive apparatus and it’s environment
are incrementally modified, until finally they implement the full Cognitive Body model derived in






An Overview of Popular Models of
Perception
What Does Perception Mean?
Different scientific communities use the term perception in different ways. Especially in the realm
of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Research (e.g.Russel & Norvig, 2002), perception is
understood as the process of extracting relevant information from sensory input. The information
is deemed relevant with respect to certain goals, and often are interpreted to represent certain
features of the world, e.g. a class distinction between edible objects and inedible ones. This view is
historically inherited by Information Theory, as it directly relates to the “input-processing-output”
nature of algorithms, and thus advances in algorithms can be directly applied to problems of percep-
tion (or vice versa). An important aspect of this perspective is, that perception is conceptualized as
a directed graph where vertices represent algorithms, and edges are the data flows between them.
Often, these graphs are additionally structured into hierarchical layers. Even the popular but un-
conventional Subsumption Architecture (Brooks, 1991) can be fit to this explanation of perception
- the main difference being its bottom-up parallel functional division instead of a hierarchical one.
Nevertheless, it is wrong to generalise this historically entrenched view to all contemporary re-
search, as there are a growing number of people that question this simplistic view on percep-
tion (Clark, 1996; Noe, 2009; Philipona et al. , 2004). Also, there is a school of philosophers called
constructivists (e.g. Heinz von Förster; von Förster & Pörksen, 1997), that propose a radically
different approach to perception, with interactive loops as their basic concept. Here, the perceived
environment is constructed by the brain, thus perception is not a process of “passively accessing”
a reality, but rather perception means using a previously established understanding of the agent’s
interactions with said reality.
1.1 The Passive, Objective Observer
The most popular framework for understanding perception is undoubtedly the one of a passive,
objective observer. This paradigm is deeply rooted in decades of Metaphysics and Epistemology
regarding the way proper Science should be (and is) conducted. In any hard Science, the observer
(by its very definition) does not interfere with the observed phenomenon. This is actually one
of the central dogmas for conducting Science. There are certain distinct advantages to separate
the observer, namely the observations can be reused by other observers as if they were done by
themselves, enabling to share and merge observations to come to a common observer-independent
(objective) conclusion. This objectivity also facilitates a rapid knowledge uptake (via teaching) and
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reliable conservation (e.g. via books or recordings). An illustration of this view on perception is
shown in Figure 1.1.1.
Supposing the understanding of an agent as a passive, objective observer, most researchers equate
perception to be synonymous to observation.
Understanding perception as an internal process of an observer necessitates a passive nature. Per-
ceiving does not change the perceived. Therefore, the only causal dependence goes from the envir-
onment (cause) to the agent (effect in the observer).
Incidentally, this view is especially prevalent within the field of Computer Science, e.g. in Computer
Vision (Marr et al. , 1980), but also in Neuroscience. Often, Researchers see perception simply as the
process of extracting knowledge from the sensor’s stream of information. Fundamental problems
like the Chinese Room Argument (Searle, 1990), and Symbol Grounding (Harnad, 1990) have to nag the
researcher, lest it simply is ignored.
Figure 1.1.1: View of perception by representation-focused classical Artificial Intelligence. The objective world model is
presumed.
1.2 Evolutionary and Other Developmental Adaptions
A different paradigm of perception is often employed by researchers with a background in Biology,
Developmental Psychology and Robotics. Perception again is a passive process of identification,
but the actual method to do so is either phylogenetically evolved or ontogenetically learned by a
teacher (or by trial and error) using specially crafted reward signals. The actual internal structure
of the agent is unimportant, only its effects to the environment (behavioural reaction to applied
stimulus).
From an explanatory point of view, this is not very satisfying, as a reward signal has to be present
for all adaptations, and the number of possible implementations for a certain behaviour prohibits
predictions to genuinely novel stimuli. This does not make it a very practical framework for all but
the simpler problems and organisms. It especially does not explain the wealth of structure in the
brains of agents, when simple learning algorithmswould suffice for associating stimuli and rewards.
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Figure 1.2.1: Behaviourism influenced view on perception. The agent’s behaviour is predetermined by the environment,
and thus its structure is unimportant.
1.3 Utility Focused Approaches
A more recent class of approaches are utility-centric. According to those, perception is a means to
achieve certain goals of the agent in the environment.
Reinforcement Learning
An important example of utility-centric approaches comes from Machine Learning. The goal of
Reinforcement Learning is to find an (optimal) policy for achieving certain tasks. The unique prop-
erty here is, that it’s not the sensory information, that gets processed, but the motoric information,
acting on the world. The sensory information merely acts as a feedback channel, informing the
Reinforcement Learning algorithm about the utility of it’s performed action. The algorithm then
constructs a (usually probabilistic) model of expected utility, such that it can compute the optimal
policy to reach a goal, given such a probabilistic model.
Reinforcement Learning still relies on the existence of a predetermined sensory apparatus, that can
at least sense the relevant states of the environment. It is often seen as a necessary preprocessing
step to condense thewealth of sensory data into amanageable number of environmental dimensions
or states.
An important difference to other algorithms in Machine Learning is, that the Reinforcement Learn-
ing idea places the learning agent into the position of choosing the next action. Thus, the agent’s
environment is not the sole source of causes.
Dynamic Systems
Dynamical Systems approaches have a longhistory in explaining coupled, recurrent systems, though
their explanatory value often breaks down due to the high dimensionality of real system’s phase
spaces. One interesting approach is pursued by Karl Friston, called the Free-Energy Principle (Friston,
2010; Friston et al. , 2009). The idea is, that an agent tries to minimize the Free Energy measure of
its bodily states, for the simple fact that it has to try to resist disorder (entropy) to perpetuate its
structural identity. This equates to the agent trying to not be surprised by the environment, by
choosing actions with better known outcomes and making better sensory predictions.
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Embodied Cognition and Extended Mind
According to Embodied Cognition, perception is chiefly facilitated by the specific physical form of
the agent’s body, and may also include neural signal paths. Popular works like those of Rodney
Brooks (Brooks, 1991) build upon this notion. It relies on evolution (and engineering), as Embodied
Cognition draws its power from a cleverly constructed body, that already contains the necessary
form to perform the intended way. Perception therefore is a property of the physical body, and not
of the brain alone.
Embodied Cognition forces the scientist to think about the part, that often gets neglected by other
paradigms, the physical body of the agent. It is seen as implementing parts of the intelligence of an
agent (“embodying” it). This approach is illustrated in Figure 1.3.1.
Building upon Embodied Cognition is the field of Developmental Robotics, dealing with the problem
of making sophisticated use of a pre-existing but unknown body by an autonomous robot. Borrow-
ing ideas from developmental psychology (Smith & Gasser, 2005), the body can also change over
time to facilitate learning objectives. The premise is, that the mind (in a classical AI sense, i.e. its
information-processing structure) of the autonomous agent needs to co-evolve (epigenesis) with
the body. Often, unsupervised learning methods are employed, or the problem is formulated as a
search for mathematical structures, i.e. detecting manifolds in high-dimensional spaces, that limit
possibilities, or express invariances (Philipona et al. , 2004).
Closely related to Embodied Cognition is the approach of the ExtendedMind (Noe, 2009; O’Regan & Noë,
2001; Clark, 2008, 1996). According to this idea, Cognition is neither confined to the brain nor the
agent’s body. It can extend into the agent’s environment, e.g. bymanipulating artefacts (like using a
sheet of paper and pencil to perform a complicated multiplication), or by externalising information
(chemical trails of ants). It calls into question the strict physical boundaries of agency, be it the
brain-body or the body-environment boundary.
Figure 1.3.1: A holistic view on perception, encompassing both brain and environment.
Both approaches take a utilitarian, holistic approach to perception. It is the tool that enables an
agent to enact its agency and separate itself from the environment. Perception is viewed as a
dynamic interaction between the brain and its environment, (usually) facilitated by its body. For
Embodied Cognition, this is the physical body of the agent, while for ExtendedMind, it is the part of the
environment, that is (currently) interacting with the brain, or even is under direct control.
The thesis was built upon the ideas of Embodied Cognition and Extended Mind,and can be related to
Developmental Robotics. But it also utilizes classical symbolic explanations where deemed appro-
priate. The presented Cognitive BodyModel builds its key design upon the philosophy of Constructiv-
ism, Embodied Cognition and Extended Mind, but the author also tries to relate as many components as
14
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possible to established knowledge and explanations in the domain of Computer Science and Informa-
tion Theory, to show that this approach is not competitive, but complementary to the one presuming
a passive, objective observer.
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Chapter 2
The Cognitive Body Model
The analysis of approaches to perception in the previous chapter highlights the need for under-
standing the “glue” between the agent’s external environment, and its cognitive realm. In this
chapter, the author proposes a genuinemodel for this glue, termed the Cognitive Bodymodel 1 , whose
inception was guided by the following questions:
• How canwe use seemingly controversial paradigms (i.e. Constructivism, Autopoiesis) for com-
plementing explanations in the research fields of perception and developmental robotics?
• Can we formulate a method to autonomously learn one’s body structure and even opportun-
istic tool use?
• Is there a way to bridge the divide between an autopoietic thought process and the surround-
ing, inherently inaccessible, environment?
• Can we formalize the processes responsible for constructing a self image of the body?
2.1 Causes, Effects and States as Projections of the Mind
Note, that in the previous section, the distinction between an agent’s body and its immediate envir-
onment was made on a quite arbitrary (albeit very useful) definition of a cell membrane or a skin.
The boundary could also be defined on a histological level, e.g. around the central nervous system.
This “brain in the vat” agency is a popular conception of western culture, and also deeply rooted in
the self image of classical mid-20th century Artificial Intelligence research. This philosophic stance
can be traced back to the works of Immanuel Kant and René Descartes. The AI paradigm implicitly
claims that the mind is located in, or enacted by, the brain, and can be studied in isolation of the
rest (the physical body, it’s environment). The problem we face with this paradigm is the classical
Homunculus fallacy, i.e. that we try to explain an intelligent agent (e.g. a human individual) by pos-
tulating another “smaller” intelligent agent (the brain) controlling the surrounding mechanistic,
clock-like machinery. This explanation can be iterated indefinitely without actually explaining the
remaining homunculus itself. Daniell Dennett argues, that such a homunculus simply does not exist
at all. It is a false belief, that can be uncovered by certain effects like change blindness (Dennett,
2004). An alternative proposition is promoted by Alva Noë (Noe, 2009). The Extended Mind does not
stop at the agents brain, and is not a property of an object (body). Rather it is to be understood
1The term Cognitive Body modelwas chosen to reflect the focus on learning a control structure for the agent’s physical
body. As this work shows in Section 2.9, the Cognitive Body is a more flexible concept, and need not be of identical (or even
similar) extent as the physical body. Therefore both concepts must explicitly be distinguished. The proposed model has
no direct connection to the likewise named Cognitive Body in the paper of Montebelli et al. , 2009.
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as a process of interaction with, and thus extending into the environment. Noë uses the metaphor
of the mind being the dance of the agent with its environment. There is no use in separating the two
dancers into the agents mind and the agents subjective environment and trying to understand their
movements separately.
At this point, I want to introduce the term Umwelt for a subjectively constructed environment, as
formulated by Jakob Johann von Uexküll (von Uexküll, 1934). According to him, the Umwelt is that
part of the complex and vast universe, which the agent is sensible for, and interacting with. Uexküll
brings the example of a tick hunting for blood, whose Umwelt is extremely simple - comprising of
things like a signal for presence of butyric acid molecules (sweat smell), a heat sense and simple
feet, but is totally oblivious to what intricate reality (a forest’s trees, a sweating deer passing by,
its own cell machinery...) actually produces those interaction patterns. All the tick cares for, is its
Umwelt.
As used in this thesis, Umwelt describes the subjective structure of the world the agent experiences.
It is not to be mistaken for the objective, real environment of an agent. The structure of the Umwelt
is constrained by the environment, but the Umwelt can likewise be restricted by the agent, through
promoting or avoiding certain interaction patterns.
Coming back to Noë’s proposition of an Extended Mind, the term Umwelt is very useful. The mind can
be interpreted as a complex (but closed) dynamic system comprised of the Umwelt on one hand, and
a cognitive apparatus (i.e. the abstract information processing capability of a human nervous system,
or an embedded computer) on the other.
To describe the Umwelt, it seems plausible to use cause-effect relationships. Karl Friston’s work
gives us an evolutionary explanation of why an agent would create them – to be able to lower the
entropy of its body states via those cause-effect relationships between actors and sensors.
2.2 The Two Views
This thesis relies on a dualist 1st person and 3rd person view on an agent model. The work pre-
supposes, that there is a difference between the objective, real world, and what the agent imagines
the world to behave like. Here, imagining is used to describe in a rather blunt way, that the agent’s
behaviour is rationally explainable in such an imagined world. This especially does not imply any
claims of the agent’s ability for experience and consciousness. A detailed graphical illustration of
the complete Cognitive Body model is shown in Figure 2.5.1 on page 26.
The Third Person View
The (objective) third person view is the most prevalent in current research of Computer Science and
Machine Learning (Russel & Norvig, 2002; Barber, 2011). The agent is separated from the Envir-
onment via some distinguished boundary, usually creating a continuous extent in space (e.g. a cell
membrane, or amobile robotic computer system), but sometimes thismight not be that obvious (e.g.
software agents). Interaction between agent and environment is organised into sending channels
(actors, efferent signals), and receiving channels (sensors, afferent signals). Also, both agent and
environment have states. In the case of the agent, states often are called memory. This model
closely resembles the architecture of a computer. The agent’s internal structure is thought to
be complicated, but mechanistically (i.e. algorithmically) explainable. The explanation may include
probabilistic elements.
An important detail for understanding this thesis is, that in this third person view, an agent only can
be reactive, in the sense that the algorithm and its parameters (i.e. the goal) are ontogenetically
predetermined. This behavioural “destiny” is either supported by an evolutionary argument or
18
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by some external omniscient entity. An evolutionary argument might be, that e.g. the goal of
maximizing energy resources is highly advantageous with respect to not trying, and therefore we
can expect an energy-maximizing algorithm to exist with high probability. The other option is, to
just let an omniscient entity choose the right parameters/goals. We usually call those entities an
engineer, designer, or scientific experimenter.
One can easily see, that a promise of understanding or designing a genuinely autonomous agent
cannot be delivered in this view, as the agent is not in charge of its development or goals, or envir-
onmental observations in the first place. Nevertheless, the third person view has powerful proper-
ties, such as independence from the actual observer and causality of explanations. This especially
means, that we (as experimenters) can deliberately cut any loops between Agent and Environ-
ment (by altering the environment appropriately) to greatly simplify our analysis of parts of the
Agent-Environment system. The third person view fits very well with investigating and describing
non-circular structures. That is, structures that can be cast into the causal Input-Processing-Output
scheme of Computer Science.
The First Person View
The first person view of an agent model is different. We literally put ourselves into the position
of the cognizing agent, i.e. we draw the boundary around the cognitive apparatus.The uniform
nature of it’s physical signals enable the agent to potentially access any internal state. In case
of humans and mammals, this is the nervous system, where only electrochemically transmitted
events exist. Humberto Maturana (Maturana & Pörksen, 2008) highlights this feature by calling
those systems closed, in the sense that those signals cannot leave the nervous system, and signals are
also exclusively generated within the nervous system. This feature of autopoietic systems excludes
the possibility of directly sensing e.g. light, sound, newtonian forces, the agent’s physical body, etc.
Consequently, those notions necessarily have to be constructed by the cognitive apparatus itself.
The way the agent thinks the environment behaves, is called the agent’s Umwelt (von Uexküll, 1934).
For a scientific, objective description of reality, this view is not well suited, as every agent has its
own private Umwelt, and worse, other agents have to be constructed in the Umwelt first, rendering
the notion of an objective description negotiated with imagined agents whimsical. Nevertheless,
from the point of understanding an autonomous agent, there is a powerful advantage. The Umwelt
can be changed by the cognitive apparatus, thus giving us the possibility to describe phenomena,
where exactly this enactment of restrictions on the environment (mediated by a certain imagined
Umwelt) plays a crucial role. This includes having amental bodymodel, skilled tool use, improvised
tool use, pretend play, and “what-if” simulation.
It is important to understand, that neither first person view nor third person view are the one and only
right paradigm of description. Both perspectives have their strengths and their respective blind
spot.
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2.3 Accessibility of States: Mirroring the Umwelt
Representation by Complementary Reverse Causal Models
We previously established in this chapter the favourability of successfully hypothesizing cause-
effect relations and accompanying environmental states outside of the cognitive apparatus. We
can embody such a set of hypotheses by a representative cause-effect model (e.g. a belief network,
or a simple logic function) within the agent.
Fundamentally, the autonomous agent wants the environment’s structure to be mirrored by an
internal model, to give it access to states not trivially accessible to the cognitive apparatus (i.e.
native nerve signals). Usually, this goal is fulfilled by setting up a simulation. A simulation recreates
the environmental structure as a copy (up to a certain accuracy). Though, with this approach
the agent faces the need for constantly matching and correcting its full simulation state with the
environment, to make sure the simulation state stays accurate. One can easily see that for any
sophisticated model this requirement gets increasingly hard to satisfy due to the bottleneck of
sensors and intrinsic observability, or simply because of the system’s dynamics (chaotic attractors).
A different approach is to use a complementary inverse model. The agent is subjectively not inter-
ested in actually recreating a faithful structure of its environment, but just to have a method for
measuring and effecting a certain state with a good accuracy or certainty. In mathematical terms,
this can be expressed as applying an inverse function to the one performed by the environment.
For effecting a certain environmental state, we can then “simply” set the corresponding agent state
and apply the appropriate inverse function:
Fenv : x! states
Fmodel : states! x
stateenv := Fenv (Fmodel (stateagent))
Fmodel  F 1env ) stateagent  stateenv
Here, stateenv is a hidden environmental state, and stateagent is its mirrored representation in the
agent. Of course, this presupposes Fenvto be bijective for at least most states x. The argument also
works, when swapping Fmodel and Fenv, so that:
Fmodel : x! states
Fenv : states! x
stateagent := Fmodel (Fenv (stateenv))
Fmodel  F 1env ) stateagent  stateenv
These two variants actually correspond to successful acting (first) and sensing (second).
Fenv can be thought as a cause-effect relationship, while Fmodel consequently is an effect-cause
relationship. In the rest of the thesis, Fmodel is called the Reverse Causal Model (R-Model), and is
implemented and represented by the cognitive apparatus (i.e. the brain) of the agent. The inverse
function of the R-Model is termed Forward Causal Model (F-Model) and denotes the cause-effect func-
tion of the environment, as the agent thinks it is (its Umwelt). This does not necessarily mean that the
F-Model is identical, or even remotely close, to the (objective)Fenv. The F-Model is not implemented
anywhere, but is implicitly defined by the corresponding R-Model. This is the key difference to a
Simulation-based approach (where the F-Model would be implemented).
An important key point is, that the R-Model (and especially the implicit F-Model) is constructed by
the agent. The F-Model does not necessarily accurately reflect the structure of the environment,
though this would be highly desirable. It rather represents the structures the agent thinks there
are (its Umwelt).
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state in agent (”desired”)
state in agent (”observed”)
R-ModelF-Model
R-ModelF-Model
Figure 2.3.1: Reverse Causal Model and Forward Causal Model connecting the agent states with the constructed environ-
mental state.
Competence and Reception Model
An illustration of the Umwelt as hypothesized by the agent is shown in Figure 2.3.1. It makes a dis-
tinction between two possible R-Models. One, that calculates what the (constructed) environmental
state is (Reception model) and the other calculates actions necessary to bring the environmental
state in line with the desired one (Competence model). These causal paths relate to observing and
controlling an environmental state respectively.
Figure 2.3.1 shows a small inaccuracy though. By having two agent states, there should actually be
two mirrored ones in the Umwelt, but there is only one shown.
The figure supposes, that both Competence Model and Reception Model relate to the same environ-
mental state, but it leaves the possibility for the input of the Competence Model (desired state) and
the output of the Reception Model (observed state) not to be equal, to account for errors along the
causal chain, and not to form a loop, which would defeat the claim on causality.
Matching the F-Model with the Environment by Invariant Causal Chains
An F-Model is only good for the agent if it accurately represents the behaviour of (parts of) its
environment. To match the F-Model to the behaviour of the environment, we can decompose the
function performed by the environment into:





where Funknown represents an arbitrary transformation, that conceptually is responsible for any
deviations between F -1modeland Fenv. If we assume two of such transformations, one mapping effer-
ent signals to an environmental state, and one from an environmental state to the afferent signals
of our cognitive apparatus, we can construct a chain of cause-effect relationships spanning from
efferent to afferent signals:
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Figure 2.3.2: Conceptual substitution of the functions performed by the environment.
The agent’s goal now is to find R-Models, so that the individualFunknown functions get trivial (Iden-
tity function). If the cognitive apparatus of the agent succeeds, it has found an invariant causal chain,
as it is illustrated in Figure 2.3.3. The invariance refers to the fact, that the output (observed state)
is highly correlated with the input (desired state).
Figure 2.3.3: Illustration of an Invariant Causal Chain.
Once such an invariant causal chain passing through the real environment is established, the (indir-
ectly) constructed Umwelt state is supposed to have a corresponding state in the environment. At
least, the environment will behave, like the F-Models describe it.
By definition, the Umwelt state will also exhibit the same (or homomorph) state trajectory as the
two internal states. This mirroring of the Umwelt state by agent-internal states makes it possible
to transparently access the hitherto hidden Umwelt state. It can now be accessed like any other
internal signals of the closed, autopoietic cognitive apparatus.
Some readers might be inclined to think that the environmental state is simply traced, or copied,
by an internal representation, as proposed by Emulation Theory (Grush, 2004). This would be a
wrong conclusion, as we are not talking about an objective environmental state, but of a state of the
(subjectively constructed!) Umwelt. As actually the perceived state is constructedwithin the agent’s
cognitive apparatus, and the Umwelt state is implicitly assumed to exist, it is real in the same sense
an ephemeral mirror image is real. Although, because of establishing the invariant causal chain by
going through the external environment, it is a reasonable assumption. In a certain sense, we can
imagine ourselves as the cognitive apparatus being in a closed room without windows to an outside
world. Suppose we additionally have a slit to pass simple orders and receive factual reports from
the other side of the walls. We could then put up mirrors on the wall and arrange some parts of the
interior, so that the mirror image looks like an actual outside world to us. If we can find an interior
arrangement and a set of rules to adapt it in accordance to the flow of orders to and reports from
the outside world, we can then pretend the mirror to actually be a window to the outside world.
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We could speak of a constructivist creation of the Umwelt by the agent. Though, I think the environ-
mental involvement with the proposed method (the interaction with an objective environment via
afferent/efferent signals) makes this explanation not a very accurate one. I want to stress, that the
creation of the invariant causal chains is on one hand restricted by the behaviour of the objectively
existing environment, and on the other hand by the subjectively constructed Umwelt. Of course, if
the differences between Umwelt and environment vanish (as it should be in a working model), the
distinction is all but theoretic.
How do we formulate a method to create those invariant causal chains, i.e. how to marginalize the
contribution of Funknown? This problem will be tackled next.
2.4 Constructing State Approximations
To find invariant causal chains, the cognitive apparatus first constructs two candidate Umwelt states,
which are then adapted to approximate the supposed environmental one. Unfortunately, without
direct access to the environmental state, the cognitive apparatus cannot simply calculate an information-
theoretic distancemeasure directly for an optimization. But we can use the Data Processing Inequality
theorem (see Section A.1), to calculate an upper bound on the Information Distance between the ap-
proximations and the environmental state, or equivalently, a lower bound on theMutual Information
. The theorem supposes a Markovian Chain though, which means that the Umwelt needs to follow
this constraint.
A Lower Bound on Mutual Information with a Hidden State
Presuming the desired state Sd, environmental hidden state Sh, and observed state So to form a
causal chain, we can apply the Data Processing Inequality theorem (Section A.1) to those states.
This gives us a lower bound on the Mutual Information I (Sh; Sd) based on entropies, which only
depend on Sd and So, but not on the inaccessible Sh.
I (Sd;Sh)  I (Sd;So)
 H(Sd; So) H (SdjSo) H (SojSd)
where H (j) denotes conditional entropies. The joint entropy H (Sd; So) can be decomposed into
conditional entropiesH (j) and (unconditional) entropiesH ():
H (Sd; So) +H (Sd; So) = [H (Sd) +H (SojSd)] + [H (So) +H (SdjSo)]
H (Sd; So) =





H (SojSd) + 1
2
H (SdjSo)
Substituting this equivalence into the Data Processing Inequality theorem yields
I (Sd;Sh)  H(Sd; So) H (SdjSo) H (SojSd)





H (SojSd) + 1
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H (SdjSo)  H (SdjSo) H (SojSd)







This lower bound on the Mutual Information between the desired state and the hidden environ-
mental state can be maximized by the agent, without having direct access to Sh. The same lower
bound can be derived for Shand So by starting with a different version of the Data Processing Inequal-
ity:
I (Sh;So)  I (Sd;So)
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Indirect Optimization of State Approximations
As the proxy statesSd andSo are calculated by the agent, they can be changed to better fit the hidden
state Sh. We can do this indirectly by maximizing the lower bound in Equation 2.4.1. We assume
to optimize over two sets Mc;Mr of possible Reverse Causal Models, that are available to define
Umwelt states Sd and So respectively. Thanks to the universal property of entropies, H (X)  0,
we can easily split the optimization of the mutual information into four separate tasks: Minimizing
H (SojSd)andH (SdjSo), and maximizingH (Sd) andH (So).
We therefore need to find a Competence model (or function)mc and a Reception modelmr :
m 1c : efferent signals! Sd









H (m (afferent signals) jSd) (2.4.4)
Note thatm 1c is, what was called a Forward Causal Model (Section 2.3) , whereasmr is a Reverse Causal
Model . This distinction is important whenmaximizing the entropiesH (Sd) andH (So) of Equation
2.4.1.
A look at Figure 2.3.3 tells us, that the variable Sd can freely be generated by any stochastic process




So, on the other hand, is computed by the Reverse Causal Modelmr. Therefore we need to maximize
the entropy of the Reception model itself:
mr = argmax
m2Mr
H (m (afferent signals)) (2.4.6)
Note, that this equation might conflict with Equation 2.4.4.
The four separate optimization goals now need to be realized by an optimization strategy.
Optimizing the Competence Model
We can minimize the entropy in Equation 2.4.3 by changing Sd, computed by the Forward Causal
Model (Section 2.3) m 1c in the Umwelt with the agent’s actors as input, and Sd as output. As the
model is actually defined by its inverse function mc in the cognitive apparatus, we can minimize
the Conditional Entropy by optimizingmc. The learning goal is, to increase the similarity between
Sd and So, i.e. to select models where Sd = So is satisfied more often (learning of the motor side
Competence model). For continuous state variables, the correlation (Sd; So) can be maximized. If
the Reception model is held constant during such an optimization, then this optimization equates to
Reinforcement Learning.
In the Cognitive Body model, the learning algorithm of the Competence model is given the reward
signal rcompetence(t) = Equality(Sd;(t); So(t+t)).
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Optimizing the Reception Model
We can minimize the entropy in Equation 2.4.4 by changing So, which means changing the afferent
Reverse Causal Model mr on the agent’s sensor side. We do this in exactly the same fashion as with
the efferent one, i.e. choose models that more often satisfy So = Sd (Learning of the sensor side
Reception model). For continuous state variables, the correlation (Sd; So) can be maximized. If the
Competence model is held constant during such an optimization, then this optimization equates to
Supervised Learning (statistical Classification).
In the Cognitive Body model, the learning algorithm of the Reception model is given the reward
signal rreception(t) = Equality(Sd(t   t); So(t)) and seeks the model with the highest reward.
This is convenient, as the structure of the Reception model becomes exactly like the Competence
model . Of course, the Reception model can also be optimized by using a supervised algorithm. In
that case, the training signal would be y(t) = Sd(t t).
Optimizing the State Distribution of Sd
Maximizing the entropy of the desired state, H(Sd), is very easy when the situation is dedicated
exclusively to learning. Then, the agent can simply sample Sd from a uniform distribution for
maximum entropy. During performance (i.e. when the set of possible desired states is predefined),
the agent can still support online learning or adaptation by maximizing the entropy within the
restricted set of desirable states. This means, that intentional variations in action execution can be
used to support online model adaptation, by keeping the bound on Mutual Information high.
Optimizing the State Distribution of So
At first glance, H(So) cannot be changed as easily as H(Sd) can be. But this is not necessary any-
way, if the three previously defined optimizations are conducted. When the conditional entropies





Thus,H(So) approximately gets maximized simultaneously withH(Sd).
2.5 The Cognitive Body Model
Figure 2.5.1 shows a big picture of the Cognitive Body model, incorporating the two distinct per-
spectives (1st and 3rd person view), where they overlap, and where they differ. Additionally, the
figure hints at the relationships between the functions of the environment, the Umwelt and the
cognitive apparatus. Finally it also shows, that the learning signals derived in the previous section,
form loops when considering information flow in both 1st and 3rd person view. Without considering
learning, the model simplifies to a chain of functions.
The mirror in between environment and brain is a metaphor for the intangible Umwelt, which is a
“reflection” of the brain’s internal organisation. Like a mirror image, it can be treated as if it was
real (1st person view), or be ignored (3rd person view). Vice versa, the same distinction can bemade
with the physical environment (ignored in 1st person view, real in 3rd person view).
For a specific set ofmodels in the cognitive apparatus to be (close to) optimal, they have to represent
an Umwelt behaving similar to the environment.
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Figure 2.5.1: Overview of the complete Cognitive Body model, with the relations between the three distinct domains of
cognitive apparatus (brain), Umwelt, and physical environment.
TheCognitive Bodymodel can also be vertically disected for analysis into an action-oriented column,
and a sensation-oriented column. The action-oriented column deals with phenomena such as tool
use, skilledmanipulation, and prediction, and represents acquired competences to change the phys-
ical body and environment (hence termed Competence column and Competencemodels). The sensation-
oriented column deals with access to states, passive observation, and recognition, and represents
the ability to passively perceive (parts of) physical body and environment. As the term “Perception”
already has a very well defined (and different) meaning, it was named “Reception” instead (hence
the terms Reception column and Reception model).
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2.6 Ensuring Independent Environmental States
We started this section with the assumption, that the environmental state Sh and the two approx-
imations form a Markovian Chain, i.e. that the two approximations are not dependent on anything




In this case, we cannot guarantee that Sh will be approximated by the So/Sd pair. This is called a
Byzantine fault, named after the Byzantine Generals Problem. (Lamport et al. , 1982).
The Byzantine Generals Problem prototypically exemplifies a failure mode of a model, where the
environment is not behaving differently in a benign, that is, detectable way.
A Byzantine Fault can be illustrated by the following example. For deciding on a value for the
amount of fuel in a car, we could take two separate measurements, and average it. A Byzantine
State could now arbitrarily change the average to a certain value by influencing one value alone,
based on the knowledge of all the other measurements. Without additional measurements (say,
checking the fuel consumption while driving, or reading the gauge at the gas station), there is no
possibility to detect, that the actual fuel level is different from the reported one.
Another example, that is more relevant to robotics and simulation, is that the Byzantine state is a
neglected experimental bias, where the desired state and the hidden environmental one are (maybe
only partly) predetermined by the setup of the experiment.
Taking Care of a Byzantine State
Luckily, there’s a solution to avoid Byzantine States with high probability. By using a random
stochastic process to generate desired states, we implicitly affirm the desired state’s independence
from any other possible state. When the agent exclusively is learning (and not performing), it
is therefore best to use a random state trajectory. If a truly random source is not available, one
can fall back on cryptographic methods, or even chaotic oscillators, to lower the chance of being
accidentally correlated with other environmental states.
Of course, during actual performance (using the models), the state trajectories of the desired states
cannot be selected arbitrarily. Here the danger of being misled by a Byzantine Fault can only be
mitigated by exploiting as much randomness in the set of feasible state trajectories as possible.
2.7 Learning Reverse Causal Models
The key to a successful Cognitive Body model, is learning the appropriate Reverse Causal Models
(R-Model). The targets for optimization were already derived in section 2.3. The R-Models need
to optimize the conditional probabilities from desired to observed state and vice versa. This can
be either done by correlative learning algorithms (Supervised Learning, Linear Regression), or by
algorithms formulated to use reward signals (Reinforcement Learning). Figure 3.1.2 on page 32
shows an illustration of a setup with two R-Models.
Becauseweneed to learn (at least) twoR-Models concurrently, and they provide their reward signals
for each other, we have a recursive feedback loop, making the evolution of such a system nontrivial.
By introducing such a loop, the system in principle might converge to trivial models (lock ups), or
exhibit oscillations in learning (circular attractors).
27
CHAPTER 2. THE COGNITIVE BODY MODEL
Compensating for Time Delays
An important detail not yet considered, is the time aspect of the states and reward signals. Due
to the constraints of causality, there is always a nonzero positive time delay in F-Models. A truly
inverse R-Model would therefore need to have a negative time delay to compensate for this fact.
Unfortunately, this is impossible, as the R-Model itself has to be implemented in the real, causal
world. Therefore, the time delay cannot be compensated by the R-Models, and thus the observed
state is delayed relative to the desired state. This delay needs to be considered when comparing
them for learning.
For calculating the incremental update of the Receptionmodel, we only need to delay the desired state
by the time delay accumulated along the causal chain. For the Competence model, things are more
complicated, though. For comparing the two states, we need the observed state of the future, i.e.
we need a negative delay on the observed state. We have to use a trick. By delaying the calculation
of the update rules, we can implement negative delays (relative to other signals). As the learning is
done incrementally in small steps, this general delay of learning does not significantly change the
learning procedure.
2.8 Hierarchical Extension
Since a successful approximation of anUmwelt state both includes evolving the capability to observe
and control it, we can also treat this newly emerged state as a new action or sensor. If we canmanage
to learn a larger set of stable Umwelt states, we can theoretically construct hierarchies of Reverse
causal models on top of them. This possible layering is illustrated in Figure 2.8.1.
Figure 2.8.1: Illustration of the possible hierarchical construction of layers of Umwelt states
This hierarchical modelling especially would get interesting, when the lower-level R-Models would
still be learning and adapting. They could then possibly optimize the semantics of their states to
provide a better fit, given the non-random restricted state trajectories imposed by the upper layers,
while the upper layers would be subject to those changes, too. Also, if more complex R-Models
can learn longer state sequences, this would probably induce different time scales between layers
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(where lower layers take care of faster and easier to predict dynamics). Due to time constraints,
hierarchical extension of the Cognitive Bodymodel was not covered in the experiments.
2.9 Advanced Uses of the Cognitive Body Model
The Growing and Shrinking Cognitive Body
Another interesting consequence of the ability to create layered sets of Umwelt states (by grouping
R-Models) is, thatwe can “switch” themonor off. Especiallywith respect to the ability of controlling
Umwelt states, switching groups of R-Models on or off yields an interesting capability, which can
be described as growing and shrinking of the Cognitive Body. If R-Models are actively used to control
Umwelt states, then this Umwelt state can be considered to be part of the Cognitive Body of the
agent. This way, an agent can opportunistically gain or release control of parts of the environment.
The states within the Cognitive Body would usually (but not necessarily) contain the states of the
physical body of the agent.
Having a growing and shrinking Cognitive Body also necessitates to comprehend perception as a
dynamic process, where the agent altering its perception is a fundamental feature, and thus there
is no single fixed “right” world model that can describe the world independently of the agent’s
stance.
Tool Use
With the Cognitive Body model, the agent could also temporally gain control over states of the en-
vironment, which are not part of its physical body, i.e. during skilled tool use. By activating the
(previously learned) R-Models, the tool becomes a part of the Cognitive Body, and the agent gains
transparent access to the environmental statesmanipulated by that tool. To give an example, we can
introspect e.g. biking or car driving. During skilled tool use (biking or driving), we don’t experience
ourself stomping our feet, swinging our arms and scanning the area in front of us. We experience
ourselves to be the bike or to be the car. We can instantly access and control states like driving
direction, wheel positions, body dynamics, fuel consumption, the grip of the tyres, and so on. The
manipulation is effortless because it is transparent to higher cognitive functions.
The Cognitive Body model also offers an explanation for improvised tool use. A previously learnt
R-Model can get repurposed by being activated in a different situation that it was learnt in. If the
environmental structure is similar enough to the learnt one (i.e. if the improvised tool provides a
function similar to the originally learnt tool), the model will provide a sensible ad hoc approxima-
tion. At the same time, the possibility to use a certain skill could possibly be detected bymonitoring
the Reception side models for familiar patterns. Neurons performing this proposed function might
resemble the behaviour of Mirror Neurons.
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Simulation and Pretend Play
Though simulation does not play a crucial role for performance in the Cognitive Body model, it
nevertheless is easy to incorporate. A simulation of effects on the Umwelt are only necessary, when
the Reception side model can not (for whatever reason) provide observations, or when the agent
only wants to act as if, without actually effecting the environment (e.g. during Pretend Play). For
those cases, we can then simply replace the observed state by a copy of the (appropriately delayed)
desired state.
Very closely related to Pretend Play, is the ability of enacting norms on the environment. When
writing words on a paper (using the respective R-Models), there is no environmental constraint
that only words can be written onto it. The constraint of the paper only showing words is actively
enforced by the agent. For an independent observer of such a constrained environment, it would
look as if the paper was physically only capable of containing words.
Learning by Observation
Learning by observation can also be nicely captured by the Cognitive Bodymodel. Depending on the
type of sensors, the Reception sidemodels will also generate state sequences for Umwelt states even
if they are not currently under control of the agent. By “replaying” observed state sequences using
the matching Competence model, the agent can instantly reproduce observed behaviour. Albeit,
the reproduction might be very crude, as it is not optimized yet.
2.10 Conclusion
The presented Cognitive Body model offers a framework for an autonomous agent to structure in-
teraction with its own body and environment into states with causal relationships. The goal is to
gain the ability to control those states if wanted. This constructed structure need not necessarily
be congruent with the structure of the real, objective world, though they likely are due to learning
mechanisms. Because of a circular information flow (due to mutual learning signals), it constitutes
a dynamical system, and therefore is subject to the same analytical problems (stability, complexity,
scalability).The Cognitive Bodymodel also offers the possibility to implement a plethora of complex
phenomena of perception, like tool use, mental simulation, and pretend play, within a single frame-
work. It does specifically not deal with planning, which is considered towork on top of the Cognitive
Body. The current work also does not cover highly adaptive environments (e.g. interaction with




This Chapter describes a series of experiments conducted to explore the general feasibility of the
Cognitive Body model. As the theoretic model first needed to be implemented and tested, the
first experiments rather validate the basic simulation. Nevertheless, they also show important
connections to well established learning problems (Classification and Reinforcement Learning).
To minimize the number of parameters (and thus experiments), a well defined simulation was
chosen over a real-world robotic implementation. This also reduces the possibility of false inter-
pretations, because it removesmany sources of error, whichwould in turn reduce the significance of
unexpected results. It also makes it possible to study the Cognitive Body model in its simplest form.
For even a very simple real-world robotic experiment, one would need to presume several Umwelt
states for a sensible application of the Cognitive Body model. On the other hand, an embodied
robotic experiment would control for an inadvertent selection bias of the environment.
3.1 Simulation Setup
To explore the theoretically derived model, the author devised a series of exploratory simulations.
The simulation series 1 establishes the correct implementation of the used algorithms, and also
serves to connect the simulation structure with those commonly used in Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning. The simulation series 2 was conducted to progressively relax the preconditions
of the simulation into a full example of the Cognitive Body model. Simluation series 3 finally takes
a look at the performance, when the number of available agent states is varied.
The simulation was implemented using the Python Programming Language and the Scientific Python
(Oliphant, 2007) framework.
The simulation is split into a cognitive apparatus and its environment. The environment (detailed
in Figure 3.1.1 on the following page) was selected to be as simple as possible, yet sophisticated
enough to not be trivially learnable. It is a simple Moore FSM (Finite State Machine) with 5 dis-
tinct states, and an input of 10 different actions. The FSM implements both deterministic and
nondeterministic (random) actions. The output of the FSM is the hidden environmental state,
which is then encoded by a sensor matrix to yield 10 binary sensor signals, that are available to the
cognitive apparatus. The sensormatrix represents the physical configuration of the agent’s sensors,
while the state transition matrix represents the physical configuration of the agents actuators.
Importantly, actions may lead to different outcomes depending on the current environmental state
(context-dependence). Also, the environmental states are hidden from the cognitive apparatus, and
constitute an information (transmission) bottleneck.
The full top-down simulation diagram for the Cognitive Body model is shown in Figure 3.1.2 on
the next page. Every simulation conducted only modifies the actual implementation of individual
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Figure 3.1.1: Emulated Environment of the cognitive apparatus.
boxes. The agent cannot access the environmental states directly under any circumstances. For
convenience though, the agent’s desired and perceived states in the simulation results are labelled
according to the corresponding environmental state. The necessary mapping of agent state to
environmental state was computed post hoc by using the maximum likelihood according to the
reception model.
Themodel is designed to use algorithms that learn on a reward signal. The reward itself is computed
by comparing desired and observed state for equality. For the Receptionmodel, supervised learning
algorithmsmay also be used by replacing Receptionmodel and equality operator, directly using the
(delayed) desired state as the learning signal.
Figure 3.1.2: Complete diagramof the simulation components for the Cognitive Bodymodel and environment. The reward
signals are computed by comparing the input of the Competence model and the output of the Reception
model for equality. The time delay filters (denoted z 1,z+1 ) compensate the delay accumulated between
desired and observed state.
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Reward-Modulated Hebbian Learning algorithm
For the implementation of the learning models, the Reward-Modulated Hebbian Learning algorithm
(Pfeiffer et al. , 2010) was chosen. The algorithm is designed to learn policies in a typical Reinforce-
ment Learning setup, i.e. it selects actions given a state and learns their utilitywith a (binary) reward
signal. It operates on discrete, sparsely coded input and output neuron populations. The algorithm
describes a close to Bayesian optimal weight update rule for a simple one-layer feed forward neural
networks, operating on a fixed encoding of input combinations. Given a certain encoding (called
Generalized Preprocessing), the algorithmcan learn anyutility function. Another feature is the locality
of its learning rule. The computation ofweight updates can be done independently for each synapse.
The Reward-modulated Hebbian Learning Algorithm was chosen because it explicitly operates on
reward signals, is mathematically well supported, and quickly converges on optimal policies. Also,
the algorithm can be used for both the Competencemodel and the Receptionmodel. Possible altern-
atives for the Reception model would be e.g. Support Vector Machines (Cristianini & Shawe-Taylor,
2000), or even a supervised/unsupervised learning hybrid like the contextual Slow Feature Analysis
algorithm (Deimel, 2009). For the Competence model, Temporal Difference Learning (Sutton & Barto,
1998) could be used. As the Cognitive Body model is formulated to be agnostic to the actual learning
algorithm, any algorithm that can handle multiple interfering inputs and learns on a reward signal,
can be used.
The main disadvantage of the Reward-modulated Hebbian Learning Algorithm is, that to be univer-
sal it requires a very resource-intensive encoding ofO (2n)neurons for n binary input variables. The
authors also present a less powerful and resource intensive encoding (Simple Preprocessing), which
is used in the Reception model because of the number of input variables (10 sensor signals).
































The update rule for the neural network, with i indexing the input neurons, j indexing the output
neurons, xi; yj2f0; 1g indicating a spike,  the learning rate, andwij being the connection weights
from input neuron i to output neuron j, is:
wij =
(
xi  yj    (1 + e wij ) when rewarded
xi  yj    ( 1  ewij ) when not rewarded
This update rule closely resembles the Hebb learning rule with a regularization term. The weights
converge to the log odd ratio of the reward probability. Learning only takes placewhen both neuron
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i and j fire simultaneously, and due to the Winner-Take-All (WTA) stage, only one output neuron
fires at a time (sparse coding). The amount and direction of weight change is modulated by the
reward. Unexpected reward outcomes result in bigger weight changes than expected ones. The
WTA stage is “soft” in the sense that not only the output neuron with the highest activation can
win, which would be a deterministic “hard” WTA .
The preceding combinatorial expansion of inputs by the Generalized Preprocessing step ensures,
that all possible input variable interactions can bemodelled by a simple linear combination. Simple
Preprocessing does not provide for modelling interactions between input variables (but is compu-
tationally more efficient).
The output of the algorithm is determined by a stochastic Winner-Take-All stage, operating on the
values of the feed forward network. The selection probability of each output is calculated from
the values with a positive, monotonic function, providing a parameter for the inherent Explora-
tion/Exploitation trade off. As in the original paper (Pfeiffer et al. , 2010), the weighing function was




For all simulations, the parameter was set to  = 5, and the learning rate to  = 0:1, unless
otherwise noted.
For the Competence Model, the Generalized Preprocessing flavour of the algorithm was chosen,
as it enables modelling the action selection depending on both current and desired state. For the
Reception model, the more scalable Simple Preprocessing was used, as it requires only 2 10 instead
of 210neurons for encoding the 10 binary sensors in the simulation.
Modifications
The actual learning rule of the Reward-Modulated Hebbian Learning algorithm was slightly modi-
fied to be able to compensate negative time delays when calculating reward. The weight update cal-
culationwas delayed by a small, fixed number of iterations, to enable comparisonwith rewards from
the future (positive time delays). This was implemented by replacing the pre- and post-synaptic
firing coincidences (xiyj) with a synaptic trace :
wij =
(
trace (xi  yj)    (1 + e wij ) when rewarded
trace (xi  yj)    ( 1  ewij ) when not rewarded
The synaptic trace is implemented as a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter. It can be formed locally
at the synapse between input and output neurons, keeping the weight update fully local as in the
original paper. A delay introduced by the added FIR filter causes the reward to be ahead of time
relative to the neuron firing coincidence. By this trick, the (otherwise non-causal, i.e. non imple-
mentable) negative time delay (z+1 filter) needed for the reward calculation of the Competence
model, can be honored.
This trick is only possible because the learning is delayed, but not the calculation of the model itself
(which would also add to the time delay of the causal chain). Finally, the delay in weight updates
has a negligible influence on the algorithm due to much slower dynamics (when   1).
For the Competencemodel, the simulations used the coefficients [0:0; 1:0; 0:0] in the FIR filter (mak-
ing it a z 1 filter). This delay is equal to the total delay of the whole causal chain in the simulations.
For the Reception model, the coefficients were set to [1:0; 0:0; 0:0] (i.e. a pass-through filter), effect-
ively reverting to the algorithm’s orignal implementation. Informal simulations indicate, that when
the FIR filter implements averaging over several iterations (i.e. coefficients [0:25; 0:25; 0:25; 0:25]),
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the algorithm still learns the optimal policy, but less fast. The desired state has to be held constant
during at least as many iterations as the FIR filter is long, though. The results suggest that the
overall time delay of the causal chain (shown in Figure 2.3.3 on page 22) can be learnt too, though
this capability was not further investigated.
3.2 Simple Baseline Simulations
Goal of the Baseline Simulations was to establish tests for the implementation of the simulation,
especially for the newly implemented learning algorithm.
For the Baseline Simulations, the simulated world was adapted to resemble two well known prob-
lems, Classification and Reinforcement Learning. problem. Both setups can easily be achieved by
presetting either of the two models to an optimal solution.
For Classification, the Competence model is fixed to select the right actions, so that (previous)
desired agent state and environmental state are always equal. One can explain this setup as the
agent being its own teacher, and setting itself a class label for each training point.
For Reinforcement Learning, the Reception Model is fixed to a solution, so that the environmental
state and the observed state are always equal. For the Competence Model, the learning setup then
looks like calculating a reward on reaching an environmental goal state. Though, in contrast to a
classical Reinforcement Learning setup (with a single fixed goal state and a related learnt policy
), we actually learn a set of (mutually independent) policies, one for each value of the desired state
variable. The goal state is randomly switched between the individual episodes.
Simulation 1.1: Classification with the Reward-Modulated Hebbian Learning
Algorithm
The first simulation pitched the Reward-Modulated Hebbian Learning algorithm to learn the re-
verse mapping of a random sensor matrix. The simulation setup resembles a simple classification
problem. The diagram of the simulated world is shown in Figure 3.2.1. The learning rate of the
Reward-Modulated Hebbian Learning algorithm was set to  = 0:1.
Figure 3.2.1: Simulation 1.1: Diagram of agent and environment. This resembles a Classification problem setup
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In the actual implementation, the Competencemodel and state transitionmatrix were hand-crafted
to yield an identity mapping from desired to environmental state, and learning was disabled by
setting the learning rate  = 0.
As expected, the Reception model quickly learned the appropriate weights. The reward average
(Figure 3.2.2) directly relates to the error rate of the learnt classifier. The average reward frequency
of virtually all episodes quickly approaches 1.0. Computing a deterministic policy from the learnt
stochastic one (i.e. replacing the soft Winner-Take-All stage of the algorithm with a deterministic
WTA) would show, that the Reception model can perfectly distinguish all states far before reaching
maximum reward.
Though, there were still a few episodes, where reward probability does not converge to 1.0. This
happened, because the sensor matrix was drawn from random values for each episode. There’s a
very small chance (about 1%) that some environmental states evoke identical sensor signals. In
those cases it is impossible for any classifier to distinguish, and thus correctly reconstruct the
environmental state (i.e. to find an inverse function).
Figure 3.2.2: Simulation 1.1:Average reward frequency histogram over time (500 episodes).
Simulation 1.2: Reinforcement Learning of Context-free Actions with Simple
Preprocessing
Next, the algorithm was put to work like in the original paper, doing a classical model-free Rein-
forcement Learning task. In the implementation, the sensor matrix was set to an Identity matrix,
and the reception model was fixed to a corresponding Identity matrix to yield an identity mapping
form environmental to perceived state. The setup is illustrated in Figure 3.2.3
The State Transition matrix (Table 3.1) was crafted to contain context-free actions. That is, a single
action always yields the same future state, no matter what the current state is (i.e. “go to state x”
actions). The rest of the states are highly context dependent.
The results shown in Figure 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 are, as to be expected. As the actions always yield the
same result no matter which is the current state, the model is able to easily learn the right weights
for an optimal action selection policy. But it also completely ignores the actions that change their
effect depending on the current environment state, andwould be perfectly fine for a certain context.
Results of the baseline simulation in the Reinforcement Learning setup with 5000 iterations and 500
episodes are shown in Figure 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. The learning rate of the models were set to  =0.1.
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to 1 1 1 1 1 1
to 2 2 2 2 2 2
to 3 3 3 3 3 3
to 4 4 4 4 4 4
to 5 5 5 5 5 5
+1 2 3 4 5 1
-1 5 1 2 3 4
permutation #1 1 2 5 4 3
permutation #2 5 4 1 2 3
permutation #3 5 3 2 4 1
Table 3.1: Simulation 1.2: Transition matrix of the environmental states.
Increasing the learning rate would greatly increase the speed of convergence, but also increase the
variance of the connection weight fluctuation. The reward settles to a maximum of approximately
0.9 due to the stochastic action selection of the Winner-Take-All stage. Chance level probability of
reward is at 0.161.
Figure 3.2.5 shows a Hinton diagram (see Section A.2 on page 68 for an explanation) of the final
connection weight matrix. The network successfully learnt the correlation between desired state
and appropriate action. The two lowest rows are biases, and are always +1 and -1 respectively. The
Greyish color indicates a high variance over different episodes, but the weights always cancel each
other out in specific weight matrices.
1The chance level is approximated by marginalizing the probability of getting into a desired state over all actions
and current states (i.e. the transition matrix), and averaging over all desired states. This naive calculation does assume
a uniform state distributions, and thus is not exact. For an exact calculation, a limit distribution using a Markov chain,
would need to be calculated.
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Figure 3.2.4: Simulation 1.2: Reward evolution histogram over time.
Figure 3.2.5: Simulation 1.2: Learnt synaptic weights.
The figure also shows, that context-dependent actions (i.e, the +1, -1, and permutation #1 to permuta-
tion #3 actions) are learnt not to be used at all. Selecting those actions indifferent to the current
state, there is only an 0.2 chance to yield a reward, whereas the context-independent actions (to 1
to to 5) have a 1.0 chance of reward.
Simulation 1.3: Reinforcement Learning of Context-dependent Actions with Simple
Preprocessing
In this simulation, the state transitionmatrix was changed to only contain actions, whose end states
depend on the starting state (relative movements).
The the reward evolution shown in Figure 3.2.6 approaches the maximum theoretical value 0.6,
because each (learnt) action leads to the desired state in 3 out of 5 states at most.
Results of the Simulation is shown in Figure 3.2.7 reveals, that out of the possible actions to reach a
state, themore context independent ones are preferred (white squares). The “snap to” actions yield
the desired result 3 out of 5 times (when marginalized over the current state), which is much better
than the marginal probability of 0.2 of the “+N” actions. The size of the squares (weight strengths)
reveal, that the model did not find a perfect, deterministic action. The weight differences in the
“-any state” and “always 1” have to cancel each other out, and can thus be ignored in the analysis.
The employed algorithm of the Competence model is Simple Preprocessing, and thus cannot learn
the optimal policy. This happens, because the Simple Preprocessing step does not provide for
capturing interactions between the input variables, and only can operate onmarginal probabilities.
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nop 1 2 3 4 5
+1 2 3 4 5 1
+2 3 4 5 1 2
-2 4 5 1 2 3
-1 5 1 2 3 4
snap to 1 1 1 2 5 1
snap to 2 2 2 2 3 1
snap to 3 2 3 3 3 4
snap to 4 5 3 4 4 4
snap to 5 5 1 4 5 5
Table 3.2: Simulation 1.3: Transition matrix of the environmental states.
Figure 3.2.6: Simulation 1.3: Reward histogram over learning time.
Next to showing the limitations, it provides an argument for using the arguably more complicated
and costly Generalized Preprocessingmethod for the Competence model.
The simulation also shows, that the model tries the best guess, and favours the “snap to X” group
of actions (which have a marginal probability of 0.6 of succeeding) over the theoretically optimal
“+N” group of actions. They have a marginal probability of only 0.2 and thus are not selected by the
model, although there exists a deterministic, optimal action for each pair of (current state, desired
state).
Note that neither the knowledge (i.e. their marginal distributions) of current state nor of the
desired state alone are enough to discriminate the optimal actions if they are context-dependent. In
extreme cases (such as the constructed one), theremight not be any action that can bemeaningfully
learnt without context of the current state at all. Figure 3.2.8 shows such a case.
Since all actions then yield a similarly bad marginal probability (0.2), all weights (representing
learnt log odd ratios) stay negative (shown in Figure 3.2.11). Due to the inability of the model to
discriminate between certain contexts (the current state of the environment), the model settles to
perform completely random action selection.
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Figure 3.2.7: Simulation 1.3: Learnt Synaptic Weights (as a Hinton diagram A.2)
Figure 3.2.8: Simulation 1.3: reward evolution with only context-dependent action.The the reward probability stays at
the chance level of 0.2
Simulation 1.4: Reinforcement Learning of Context Dependent Actions with
Generalized Preprocessing
As the algorithm with Simple Preprocessing cannot capture the essential interactions between cur-
rent state (the context) and desired future state for context dependent actions, we need to change
to the Generalized Preprocessing flavour of the algorithm. This algorithm can learn any conditional
dependencies between actions and the inputs, by simply expanding them into a sufficiently big set
of conditional probabilities. Of course, this comes at the price of model complexity and increased
computation demand, and a less favourable scaling behaviour.
Simulation 1.4 again uses the same transition matrix as simulation 1.2, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Running the experiment with the same environment as before shows, that the Competence model
can now easily learn the optimal policy. The reward evolution in Figure 3.2.10 shows a fast increase
early on. The Hinton diagram of the weight matrix (Figure 3.2.11) shows a memorable “staircase”
pattern, which is due to the specific state transition matrix used in the experiment (and thus, the
semantics of the actions). The whiteness/darkness of the squares represents the empirical variance
over several episodes (500). Grey squares indicate high variance (logarithmically scaled), whereas
pure white/black squares indicate zero variance. As shown, most squares, even the ones with small
values, are very similar (i.e. predictable) over different episodes.
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Figure 3.2.9: Simulation 1.3: learned weights
Figure 3.2.10: Reward average histogram of simulation with only context-dependent action
Conclusions to Simulation Series 1
Simulation series 1 was designed to test the simulation framework and the implementation of the
employed algorithms on known tasks, and assert their proper function. This was done by splitting
the Cognitive Body model into two separate parts matching the orthodox Classification and Rein-
forcement Learning paradigms. It also demonstrated the reasons for choosing twodifferent flavours
of the Reward-modulated Hebbian Learning algorithm for Reception and Competence models.
The simulations showed, that the algorithm is well suited in principle to reliably and quickly infer
the correct inverse function to the environment for the Reception model and Competence model
when they are separately learned .
3.3 Closing the Loop: Stability of Concurrent Learning
So far, the simulations only established well known behaviours, and were meant to set a baseline
for subsequent experiments. In the next step, the simulation was reconfigured into its intended
setup - both the Reception model and the Competence Model are learning at the same time. To in-
troduce the changes incrementally, the first simulation is run with amanually preset weights of the
Reception model, and a matching trivial sensor matrix (Identity matrix). Subsequent simulations
remove the presets one by one. By doing this gradually, we are adding potentially destabilizing
factors separately, and we gain a fine-grained empirical indication of the models performance. The
final simulation removes any presumptions about the environmental statemachine (in themodels),
and implements a randomly generated environment.
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Figure 3.2.11: Simulation 1.3: learned synaptic weights.
Analytic tools
Injectivity and Surjectivity of the Implied Deterministic Map
To ease the analysis of the performance, a new type of measure was calculated. For any given
simulation step, one can compute the optimal deterministic policy for the (probabilistic) Reception
model. Together with the sensor matrix, it constitutes a function from environment state to agent
state:
F : statesenvironment ! statesagent
F (e) = max
x2statesagent
p(xje)
where p(xje) denotes the conditional probability of agent state x being selected by the Reception
model, given the environment state e.
This function (or map) can be characterized via the mathematical properties of surjectivity and
injectivity (Section A.3 on page 68). It tells us the relation between the two realms, and can be
understood as binding them together, effectively giving the agent states a grounded meaning.
An injectivemap implies, that everyworld state is uniquely distinguishedwithin the agent, and thus
no information is lost. A surjective map implies, that all agent states are utilized, and therefore no
more states can be learnt. Either situation indicates an optimal map, in the sense that as much
information as possible is transferred from environment to the agent states. For simulation series
2, an injective map is also a surjective map, because of the equal number of world and agent states.
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Figure 3.3.1: Concurrent Learning Setup. Both the Reception model and the Competence model are learnt concurrently,
and provide each other an approximation of the theoretically optimal reward signal.
For performance analysis, only the deterministic maps calculated from the Reception model were
used. A similarmap could be calculatedwith the Competencemodel too, but is slightlymore difficult
due to the context-dependent nature, necessitating an additional marginalization over the input
of observed state. When the Reception side learns to distinguish all environment states reliably,
learning the Competence side simplifies to a Reinforcement Learning task. Both simulation series 1
and the original paper (Pfeiffer et al. , 2010) show, that this happens predictably and fast. The same
is true, when the Competence model develops an injective deterministic map before the Reception
model does, simplifying learning to a Classification problem. In either case, bothmodels will quickly
develop injectivity, and therefore the Reception model’s map properties are a good estimator for
the Competence model’s map properties, and vice versa.
Unassociated States
A second, less strict measure of success was computed by counting the number of unassociated
states. Those are agent states, that never are most likely to be selected by the Reception model,
given any possible environment state. When computing the deterministic map, these states are
not related to any environment state. They can be understood as having no grounded meaning
(yet). The minimum possible number of unassociated states happens, when the deterministic map
either is injective or surjective. The maximum occurs, when a single agent state is most likely for
all environment states. So the number of unassociated states is in the interval:
nagent > nunassociated  max(0; nagent   nenvironment)
where nagent and nenvironment are the number of possible states of the agents models and the en-
vironment respectively. The number of unassociated states tells us, whether a model can distin-
guish almost all states (nunassociated is small), or it does not distinguish many environment states
(nunassociated is big).
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Simulation 2.1: Baseline Recreation
In the first simulation setup, the Receptionmodel wasmanually preset to an optimal solution. It was
set to bijectively map the environmental state to the agent’s perceived state, and the learning rate
was set to =0 to switch off learning. The Competence model had to be learnt, and was preset to





















nop 1 2 3 4 5
+1 2 3 4 5 1
+2 3 4 5 1 2
-2 4 5 1 2 3
-1 5 1 2 3 4
random U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5)
random U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5)
random U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5)
random U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5) U(1,5)
















Sensor 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sensor 1 0 1 0 0 0
Sensor 2 0 0 1 0 0
Sensor 3 0 0 0 1 0
Sensor 4 0 0 0 0 1
Sensor 5 0 0 0 0 0
Sensor 6 0 0 0 0 0
Sensor 7 0 0 0 0 0
Sensor 8 0 0 0 0 0
Sensor 9 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.3: Simulation 2.1: Transition table (left) and sensor matrix (right). U(1,5) denotes the (discrete) uniform
distribution. The columns relate to environmental states, the rows to either actions or sensor vector elements.
transitionmatrix of the environmentwas set to the same context-dependent actions as the previous
simulations, except that five were replaced by nondeterministic actions. These actions effect a
random change of state, and thus are maximally useless for the control of state. This was done
to provide for potential “false positives”, as there’s a chance of p= 0:2 that those random actions
still yield the right state. Including 5 “useless” actions also decreases the likelihood of selecting
the correct action by chance, thus giving a better interpretability of the reward histogram. The
sensor matrix (mapping environmental state to sensor signals) was preset to the identity matrix.
The tables in 3.3 show the experimental setup.
Figure 3.3.2 shows the learnt conditional probabilities of a single episode. The names of the agent
states are assigned post simulation by calculating the most likely agent state corresponding to a
given environmental one (deterministic policy). Due to the (in principle) arbitrary mapping, a
statistic of the synaptic weights over several episodes is not meaningful.
The results are comparable to the ones obtained in Simulation 1.4. As the implementation now
employs two models, there are also two soft Winner-Take-All stages at work. This reduces the
ultimately attainable reward (shown in figure 3.3.3) compared to Simulation 1.4.
Simulation 2.2: Concurrent Learning of Reception and Competence Model
The goal of this simulation was to corroborate the hypothesis that the loop, formed by environ-
ment and learning algorithms, creates a stable, stationary dynamic system, i.e. it has a static limit
case once a locally optimal solution is found. Ideally, a stability analysis would be conducted by
mathematical analysis and proof for certain classes of environments. Although the model (and
thus implicitly the Umwelt) is set up as an analytically tractable causal chain, the model’s outputs
influence each other indirectly via the learning signals. Thus, itmight be possible for the twomodels
to converge to trivial, self-sufficient solutions, regardless the environment structure.
In this experiment, both models within the agent were initialized to uniform weights (correspond-
ing to aminimal prior expectation), and learning rateswere set to  = 0:1. Statistics were computed
44
Master Thesis: Making Sense
Figure 3.3.2: Simulation 2.1: Hinton diagram A.2 of the calculated conditional probabilities of the Competence and
Reception model. The left diagram shows P (action j observed state; desired state) , the probabilities of
selecting a certain action (column), given a certain concurrence of observed and desired state (row), depicted
as a desired state transition. Rows always add up to a marginal probability of p = 1:0. As this diagram is
easier to interpret, it was used in subsequent simulation in favour of visualising weight matrices. The right
diagram shows the conditional probabilities learnt by the Reception model
Figure 3.3.3: Simulation 2.1: Reward histogram. A high reward average implies a congruency between the state
trajectories of (delayed) desired and observed state. As a difference to the previous Simulations, there are
two soft Winner-Take-All stages operating, which explains the roughly twice as high rate of reward miss in
the settled state.
over 50 episodes.
Note, that both models within the agent use a stochastic algorithm. Though one can easily change a
parameter in the soft Winner-Take-All stage of the used algorithm to create a deterministic policy
(similar to Simulated Annealing), if this is needed. In this experiment, the algorithms selects the
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wrong actions with a probability of roughly 10% . Thus, the (continuously learning) models are
constantly perturbed by wrong model decisions (and thus faulty reward signals). They can in prin-
ciple adapt to any other environmental structure as fast as if the hadn’t learned anything at all. In
this experiment series, the learning rate  was deliberately set very high and kept at this level to
surface latent instabilities. In an application setting, of course, one would decrease the learning
rate significantly, once a high reward ratio was reached for some time.
Figure 3.3.4: Simulation 2.2: Reward histogram. Different to the setup with learning only a single model, the reward at
first (up to ca. iteration 1500) does not move away from chance level (0.2). In this stage, the behaviour of the
system can be described as a stochastic search, trying to find a combination of Competence and Reception
model firings, that yield an above average (above chance) reward. Once a stable causal chain is found, the
model quickly converges to a stable model.
The evolution of the average reward in Figure 3.3.4 shows, that after an initially low value (at chance
level), the reward quickly rises, as the two models find mutually rewarding mappings for certain
combinations of desired and observed agent states . In the beginning, the learning verymuchworks
like a stochastic optimization, because the desired state / action / perceived state combinations are tried
randomly (due to the stochastic nature of the employed learning algorithm). Figure 3.3.5 shows
the evolution of the Reception model, according to a certain global feature. When the Cognitive
Body model successfully approximates each environment state with (at most one) agent state ,
then this relation constitutes an injective map from the former to the latter. We can calculate
such a (deterministic) map from environment to agent state by chaining the sensor matrix with
the deterministic policy of the Reception model. This map tells us, which environmental state
each agent state (most likely) corresponds to. In the optimal case, this map is injective, i.e. all
environmental states map to different agent states and are thus distinguishable within the agent.
This property was used in subsequent experiments to quantify the success of an episode, as the
direct assessment of the learnt conditional probabilities get very difficult with increasingly complex
environments.
The left diagram in Figure 3.3.5 shows, that once a simulation develops an injective map between
world and agent states (black pixel), it stays injective. An injective map between world and agent
states constitutes an optimal solution, as all hidden states can be perfectly distinguished by the
agent. Though, there are few episodes that do not develop stable injective maps. The right dia-
gram shows a histogram over the marginal probability of injectivity. An episode either develops a
constantly injective map (frequency=1.0), or it develops no injectivity at all (frequency=0.0).
Figure 3.3.6 shows a histogram of the number of agent states unassociated with an environmental
one. Even in those few cases, where the map does not develop injectivity, it still can distinguish
3 states, and mangle the remaining two into one. This leaves one agent state unassociated. This
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Figure 3.3.5: Simulation 2.2: Histograms of Injectivity probability (black=1.0 probability).
For each simulation step, the most likely map (deterministic policy) from environmental state to agent state
(as implied by the Reception)model is calculated. The left diagram shows the frequency of injectivity as pixel
darkness for each simulated episode (y axis) and simulation time (x axis). White denotes no occurrence,
and black denotes constant occurence over the binned interval of iterations. The right diagram shows
a histogram of the marginal frequency over all episodes with respect to simulation time. Frequency is
calculated by binning and averaging the binary property.
Figure 3.3.6: Simulation 2.2: Histogram of the number of “free” unassociated agent states.
If all environmental states can be distinguished, then the number of unassociated agent states is 0.
suggests, that the model learns most of the environmental structure, even in those cases where it
does not learn it perfectly.
The statistics over multiple episodes show, that the two concurrent learning algorithms robustly
develop a locally stable set of models (Figures 3.3.4, 3.3.5). Although the environmental structure
is fixed in this simulation, there are several optimal solutions. They are homomorph, as they can
be transformed into each other by permuting the model states, and the model’s synaptic weights
accordingly. For analysis, the mapping of environmental state to the most likely agent state (us-
ing sensor matrix and Reception model) was extracted post simulation, to provide understandable
labels of the model states in the figures.
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Figure 3.3.7: Simulation 2.2: Example for learnt conditional probabilities for selecting actions (left) and selecting
observations(right) of a single episode.
The sensor matrix of the environment (Table 3.3) is trivial, so the reverse mapping of the Reception
model (Figure 3.3.7) likewise is. The mapping of agent-internal Umwelt states (= model outputs) to
the corresponding environmental states can arbitrarily be permuted. In the case of the simulated
world, there are 5! = 120 distinct models that are equally optimal given a matching permutation of
the mapping of Umwelt states to actions. An interesting detail is the fact, that learning bothmodels
together increases the number of discoverable optimalmodels by n! (n being the number of Umwelt
states), countering the necessary increase of dimensionality in model space (Reception models 
Competence models) .
This simulation also shows an interesting behaviour in the convergence. Reward evolution (Figure
3.3.4) can be divided into two distinct stages. In first stage (iteration 0 to roughly 1500), the models
do not show progress and stay close to the chance level of 0.2. Then, in the second stage, the
average reward suddenly rises rapidly to the maximum average reward of about 0.8 (limited due
to the model’s probabilistic nature ). A possible interpretation is, that In the first stage the models
cannot easily converge. They initially have to rely on the lucky coincidence of a matching state
observation and action selection to achieve an above-chance reward. In the second stage, the focus
shifts on rather filling the holes of the models, e.g. to reliably distinguish states from others and
select efficient actions in different contexts (desired states). This partition of behaviour might
occur, because of a progressing reduction of search space. When an agent state gets associated with
an environment state, stochastic search concentrates on a model subspace, reducing the effective
dimensionality of the remaining search.
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Sensor 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sensor 1 0 1 0 0 0
Sensor 2 0 0 1 0 0
Sensor 3 0 0 0 1 0
Sensor 4 0 0 0 0 1
Sensor 5 1 0 0 0 0
Sensor 6 1 1 0 0 0
Sensor 7 1 1 1 0 0
Sensor 8 1 1 1 1 0
Sensor 9 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.4: Simulation 2.3: Sensor activation w.r.t. environmental states. Different to simulation 2.2, sensor 5 to 9 also
include some information about the environmental states.
Simulation 2.3: Sanity Check
In this simulation, the goal was to test, whether the performance of the previous simulation was
only a lucky strikewith respect to the chosen environment, and therefore replaced the environment
with a more complicated version. The agent side is not changed, i.e. the full Cognitive Body model
is used, with learning rate  = 0:1. The statistics are calculated over 50 episodes.
Figure 3.3.8: Simulation 2.3: Histogramof reward andunassociated states. The systemconverges quicker to themaximum
reward than simulation 2.2 (Figure3.3.4), but the final distribution shows a fatter lower tail due to more
episodes having unassociated states.
The results show a better reward histogram (Figure 3.3.8) than the previous simulation. As the
sensors providemore (redundant) information about the environmental state, the receptionmodel’s
updates lead to bigger cumulated weight changes. The histograms in Figure 3.3.9 tell a different
story, more episodes failed to develop an injective map.
Figure 3.3.10 quantifies this difference. Overall, the differences to the previous simulation are
modest. Inspecting the conditional probabilities of a learnt Reception model (Figure 3.3.11) tell
us, that the model learnt to use all available information, and not just a subset of the sensors data.
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Figure 3.3.9: Simulation 2.3: Histograms of Injectivity probability.
Figure 3.3.10: Simulation 2.3: marginal probability of Injectivity in comparison to simulation 2.2.
Simulation 2.4: Stability with a Random Sensor Matrix
One of the claims of the Cognitive Body model also is, to be able to cope with unknown (thus arbit-
rary) sensor and actor mappings. In this experiment, the sensor matrix was replaced by a randomly
generated matrix. A random replacement of the state transition table was not yet included, as
to make informal interpretation (and error checking) of the learnt behaviour tractable, enabling
sanity-checking the simulation. Also, from a probabilistic point of view, doing two randomizations
consecutively instead of one does not change the probability distribution in model (search) space.
Of course, the model can only learn an optimal (bijective) mapping, if it is at all possible to distin-
guish every environmental state based on the generated sensor signals. Such a degenerated sensor
matrixwould change themaximumattainable reward of the agent, and thus not be directly compar-
able to the previous experiments. To avoid this, generatedmatrices of Rank less than 5 (the number
of environmental states) were discarded. The rank was calculated numerically using Singular Value
Decomposition. Matrices containing close to zero eigenvalues (i < 0:1) where discarded. This
effectively ensures that the rank of the sensor matrix equals the number of environmental states.
Thanks to the intentionally sparse encoding of 5 environmental states into 1024 distinct sensor state
vectors, only very few randomly generated matrices actually have to be discarded.
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Figure 3.3.11: Simulation 2.3: Example for learnt conditional probabilities for selecting actions (left) and selecting
observations(right) of a single episode.
Figure 3.3.12: Simulation 2.4 and 2.4b: Reward evolution , with a randomly chosen sensor matrix of rank 5. (left:  = 0:1,
right:  = 0:25)
Figure 3.3.12 shows the reward evolution of simulation 2.4. The left diagram shows no surprises,
and behaves similar to previous simulations. This validates the hypothesis, that the Cognitive Body
model can in principle learn any sensorimotor contingencies, if they have the same algorithmic
complexity as the class of Finite State Machines.
The right diagram shows a the statistics for an even more aggressive learning rate. It speeds up the
establishment of mutual reward in the beginning, but the wide lower tail of the histogram in later
stages of the simulations indicate, that the models are not as stable. Though, the right diagram in
Figure 3.3.14 (frequencies of injective maps) tells a different story. Learning performance is only
increased in the beginning, and the advantage diminishes with further iterations. This indicates,
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Figure 3.3.13: Simulation 2.4: Example of learnt conditional probabilities of the Competence and Reception model of a
single simulation instance.
that the number of non-converging episodes of Simulation 2.4 cannot be reduced by increasing the
learning rate (as would be expected with an exploration-exploitation trade off).
Figure 3.3.13 shows the outcome of one simulated episode. The agent successfully learns the map-
ping of the observed/desired Umwelt state combination to the facilitating action(s).
Due to the arbitrary map of environmental to agent states, the labels of the agent states have to
be calculated on the fly, and can (and indeed do) change during a simulation. To create the labels,
an optimal deterministic policy was computed from the Reception model. The agent states labels
denote themost likely environmental states that the specific agent state represents (both perceived
and desired). A label of “?” was used for agent states that never are most likely selected given any
certain environmental state, whereas e.g. “2,3” signifies an agent state that is most likely selected
given environmental state 2 or 3.
Due to the random nature of the sensor matrix, the learnt probabilities of the Reception model in
Figure 3.3.13 (right diagram) is not intuitively interpretable. Therefore, the analysis has to rely on
the previously introduced implicit properties of unassociated states and injectivity, shown in Figure
3.3.14
Overall, the results of simulation 2.4 revealed, that quite a few episodes do not converge to an
optimal solution (thus not yielding a surjective map). Though, the distribution of unassociated
states (Figure 3.3.14) shows that in all those episodes, there are only 2 states mangled (leaving
one unassociated state). The agent still learnt a model, that mirrors most of the environment.
Nevertheless, it is an interesting observation, that the model does not necessarily converge to an
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Figure 3.3.14: Simulation 2.4: Histogram of unassociated agent states, and the marginal probability of injectivity with
respect to. different learning rates (2.4: = 0:1, 2.4b:  = 0:25)
Figure 3.3.15: Simulation 2.4: Evolution of injectivity. The majority of episodes develop an injective map after about 2000
iterations.
optimal solution, i.e. the search space is all but free from local suboptimalminima. Further research
could focus on events during learning that cause the Cognitive Body model to succeed developing a
surjective map or not.
Simulation 2.5: Stability with Random Sensor and State Transition Matrix
In this experiment, we both randomly initialize the sensor matrix and the state transition matrix of
the environment, thereby relaxing the environment to be an arbitrary 5-state Finite State Machine.
The same considerations as in simulation 2.3 apply. Though, because of the completely random
nature, we cannot intuitively assess the performance of the Competence model any more (e.g. by
checking the sensibility of learnt preferred actions). Therefore we have to rely on computed math-
ematical properties of the (most likely) maps implied by the probabilistic models, and the reward
evolution.
As with simulation 2.4, one constraint was put on the randomly generated environments. Both the
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transition and the sensor matrix were required to keep all world states separable in principle, i.e.
no essential information about the environmental states was lost.
Figure 3.3.16: Simulation 2.5: Histogram of reward and unassociated states.The performance is similar to simulation 2.4,
confirming the expectation, that randomization of the transition function additional to the sensor matrix
does not change the environment’s complexity.
Figure 3.3.17: Simulation 2.5: Evolution of injectivity. The data are very similar to the ones obtained in simulation 2.4.
The results of simulation 2.5 are almost identical to the ones in simulation 2.4. This implies, that the
Cognitive Bodymodel relies neither on specially crafted actions nor on special sensor configurations
in its environment (as long as they provide enough information to make the states separable). As
with the simpler environments of previous simulations, most (roughly 4 out of 5) episodes quickly
converge, while the rest take an exceptionally long time. This failed convergence on an injective
map does not happen because of certain “bad” environments, as the results of simulation 2.2 and
2.3 show. This happens also, when a single environment is simulated repeatedly.
To investigate this phenomenon of non-convergence, the experiment was run for an extended
period (200’000 iterations) with an increased number of episodes (1000). The results are shown in
Figure 3.3.18 on the next page. The dotted line shows a fitted power law function p(i) = 32:0i 0:54.
The diagram suggests, that the convergence behaviour can be modelled with a Pareto distribution.
This distribution is heavy-tailed, and we can not calculate an expectation value for the time until
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Figure 3.3.18: Simulation 2.5, long run: Probability of an episode not developing injectivity w.r.t. learning time. (1000
episodes, 200’000 iterations)
an episode develops injectivity (as  >  1).
If calculation of the injectivity property was possible by the agent (it isn’t), we could easily improve
the convergence speed by resetting unsuccessful episodes after a fixed amount of iterations. This
would lead to a geometric series with a finite expectation value. Unfortunately, the agent cannot
decide, which model has developed an injective map, because it cannot access the environment
state. To approximate the reset trick, the agent could operate an ensemble of models, and periodic-
ally reset all but the best performing one, as measured by the internally available reward signals.
This way, an already optimal solution will be preserved during resets, as it will yield the highest
possible reward. This Ensemble Learning could be stopped as soon the reward does not increase for
several resets, making further increases highly improbable.
Conclusions to Simulation Series 2
The Simulation series 2 aimed to construct step by step an example application of the Cognitive
Body model. By successively removing constraints, the experiments show, that an Agent can learn
to fully control and observe an arbitrary 5-state Finite State Machine.
A model was defined to be optimal, when each agent state is most likely to be selected by the
Reception model in at most one environment state. This definition implies, that the calculable
deterministic policy of the Reception model results in an injective map from environment state
to agent state.
Figure 3.3.19 on the following page shows the success of all simulation according to the probability
of developing an injective map. The two hand selected environments (simulation 2.2 and 2.3) over-
and underperform respectively the generic case (simulation 2.5). Simulation 2.4, 2.4b and 2.5 show
a similar evolution.
The simulations revealed, that in the majority of cases, the Cognitive Body model develops an
implicit injective map. This only takes a moderate amount of iterations, usually around 2000-3000,
which translates to roughly testing every state-transition/action pair (5  5  10 combinations) 10
times.
The typical evolution of the reward can be narrated to the Cognitive Body model first randomly
trying (reward at chance level), but then having an “Ahamoment”, where reward quickly rises. The
(average) development then reaches a point, where all states of the environment have a distinct and
unique corresponding state pair within the agent. Still, the experiments also pose questions, such
as why a substantial amount of episodes (roughly 10-20%) only come close to the optimum, but do
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Figure 3.3.19: Simulation series 2: quantitative comparison of marginal probabilities of all simulations.
not actually reach it. The cumulative distributions of the mathematical properties of the (model-
implied) deterministic decision policies clearly show that this is not an artefact of an asymptotic
(stochastic) behaviour, but rather indicates a “fat tail” distribution.
Once an optimal (injective) map between environment and agent states is established, the system
keeps this property, evenwith a quite high learning rate of  = 0:25 and substantial stochastic noise,
due to the Soft Winner-Take-All stages of the used algorithms and the “random” actions available
in the environment. An important aspect is, that this stability is reached even without an online
adaption of the learning rate. Thus, the agent is not locked in to a certain environment, but will
adapt its models, if it changes.
A weak point of the Cognitive Body model is revealed by the probability distribution for an episode
not developing an injective map. A long term simulation suggests, that it likely follows a Pareto
distribution. Its coefficient roughly is  = 0:5, and therefore no sensible expectation value can be
computed. This is an undesirable behaviour, and suggests that improvements can be made to the
learning strategy, to yield an exponentially fast convergence .
An important constraint was put on the type of environment. The agents models capability to
represent 5 states was matched to the environment’s 5 states beforehand. Thus, this simulation
series explicitly does not address behaviours and problems related to differing numbers of states.
This is addressed in the next simulation series.
3.4 Exploring Incongruities Between Umwelt and
Environment
One remaining crutch of the previous exploratory simulations is, to predefine the amount of states
for the agent to model. Of course, in a realistic setting, knowing the right amount of states is a near
impossibility, and there are disadvantages arising from both having too few or too many states.
Simulation series 3 was conducted to explore the behaviour of the Cognitive Body model under
such conditions. Another possible source for incongruities between Umwelt and environment are
different mathematical frameworks. It is quite conceivable, that the environment follows a set of
differential equations, while the agent tries to explain them by difference equations, or via a Finite
State Machine.
In the case of the model having less states than the environment, one would expect the model to
“lump together” states that are marginally different, and simply not differentiate between those.
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Depending on the exact structure of the environment, this might be associated with a loss of pre-
dictability of action outcomes.
In the case of toomany agent states for a given environment, onewould expect an unstablemapping
of states, as several agent states would compete for representing the same environmental one, and
their probability distributions within the models would converge. A sophisticated algorithmmight
leverage this fact for pruning unneeded states (and thus, computational complexity) from both the
Competence and Reception model.
The simulations use the same experimental setup as simulation 2.5. Statistics are computed over
50 episodes, learning rate  = 0:1, and the environment is a randomly drawn 5-state Finite State
Machine (with all states distinguishable/reachable). The simulation was run with 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and
20 agent states available to the agent. The simulations are numbered 3.1 to 3.7 respectively.
Figure 3.4.1: Simulation series 3: Evolution of injectivity with respect to number of used agent states (surjectivity for 4
agent states).
Figure 3.4.1 shows a comparison of the evolution of in- or surjectivity for each simulated number of
agent states. the 5-state curve resembles the base case of the previous experiments.
The 4-state model has one less state than needed to fully mirror the structure of the environment,
so, it can also not develop an injective map. Nevertheless, we can use the surjectivity property
to assess, whether the model associated all its states with environmental states, which is the best
possible outcome. Not surprisingly, amodel with too few states converges faster to a surjectivemap,
as there are fewer combinations to learn, and hard to discern states can stay mangled together.
The simulations with 6, 7, and 8 agent states show interesting behaviour. Figure 3.4.1 shows, that
models having spare states develop injectivity roughly as fast as the 5-state base case. So, the num-
ber of agent states does not greatly influence the speed ofmirroring the environment. Additionally,
significantly more episodes develop injectivity in the long run if there are spare states available
in the agent. Though, the right diagram shows, that for models that use many more states than
necessary, this advantage breaks down.
Inspection of the evolution of single episodes (Figure 3.4.2, left diagram) reveals, that the Reception
models do develop injective maps (darkness of pixels), but these maps are not stable, because it
does not fit to the states learnt by the Competence model (indicated by the low mutual reward).
Simulation 3.7 with 20 states behaves similarly to 3.6 with 12 states. Overall, these observations
suggest, that it is better to have a slightly bigger model within the agent than strictly necessary.
When dealing with spare agent states, what happens with them in a model with a developed in-
jectivity?. One hypothesis is, that the conditional probabilities for such a spare state are rather
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Figure 3.4.2: Simulation 3.6: Evolution of injectivity, and histogram of reward. The reward stays at chance level ( 1
12
) for
many times longer than compared to the simulations with less states.
uniform, due to the states not having any correspondence and thus the occasional occurrence is
totally random. Another hypothesis is, that the models develop conditional probabilities similar
to those of another (associated) state. This would be bad, because then, two or more agent states
would compete with each other to represent the same environment state - and the most likely state
would perpetually fluctuate.
Figure 3.4.3 shows the conditional probabilities of one episode each from simulation 3.3 and 3.4.
The columns with the label “state ?” denote the spare states. It is easy to see, that all conditional
probabilities are very small, indicating that the state is not likely to be selected with any sensor
input. The Competence model shows a similar, but less pronounced behaviour. Figure 3.4.4 shows
the learnt conditional probabilities of one episode each of simulation 3.3 and 3.4.
We can draw the conclusion, that the spare states are not duplicates of other associated states.
Because of their distinct pattern of conditional probabilities, these states could easily be pruned
from a model.
Conclusions to Simulation Series 3
Simulation series 3 explored the behaviour of the Cognitive Body model when the number of agent
states differs from the number of states in the environment. Models with a few more states than
necessary show a higher probability of optimally mirroring the environment states than the base
model with an equal number of states. The advantage breaks down, when there are many more
agent states available, as shown in simulation 3.6 (12 states) and 3.7 (20 states).
Cognitive Body models that have fewer states than needed, still exhibit favourable dynamics, and
quickly associate all agent states with a corresponding environmental one. This observation sug-
gests, that a Cognitive Bodymodel can start with too few states, and then gradually add agent states
to the Competence and Reception models, until some states exhibit the behaviour of spare states.
The simulation series only explored cases where both environment and themodels within the agent
operate on the same mathematical framework (Finite State Machines, in this case). It is quite
conceivable, that e.g. the environment follows a set of differential equations, while the agent tries
to explain them by difference equations. It is unknown, whether the Cognitive Body model leads to
sensible approximations in those cases.
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Figure 3.4.3: Simulation 3.3 and 3.4: Examples of conditional probabilities of the Reception model for 6 and 7 states.
3.5 Conclusions and Open Questions
The conducted experiments explored the application of the Cognitive Bodymodel on autonomously
learning a restricted but nontrivial simulated environment with its intrinsic states hidden to the
agent. The simulations showed, that the Cognitive Body model is viable, and can match internal
models to an environmental structure for the purpose of transparent access and control. The use of
aggregate mathematical properties (injectivity and surjectivity) of maps proved to be efficient and
a selective criterion to evaluate the approximation process. Though there is a significant number
of cases, where the hidden environmental states are not perfectly separated within the agent, they
are at least close to an optimal solution, quantifiable by the number of unassociated agent states.
The experiments in simulation series 2 showed, that an agent implementing the Cognitive Body
model can autonomously learn to access the hidden states of any arbitrary 5 state Finite State
Machine (iff information-theoretically possible) within a modest amount of iterations, including
probabilistic actions. The histograms of the reward evolution can be interpreted to show “Aha”
moments, after which reward, starting from the initial chance level, suddenly increases. A weak
point is the low (ca. 0.7-0.8) probability of finding an optimal solution (injective map from envir-
onment to agent state) within a limited amount of time, when there is an equal number of agent
and environment states. This can be remedied by providing “spare” agent states, and possibly by
Ensemble Learning.
The agent states also exhibited stabilitywith respect to their semanticmeaning, which are grounded
by their co-occurrence with the environmental states. This was observed with a relatively high and
constant learning rate of  = 0:1 . Because learning is not stopped, the models would still be able
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Figure 3.4.4: Simulation 3.3 and 3.4: Examples of conditional probabilities of the Competence model for 6 and 7 states.
to quickly reorganise to fit a changed environment, e.g. in case of an injury.
An influence difficult to predict was the number of agent states with respect to the number of
environment states. Simulation series 3 showed, that the Cognitive Body model works even better
when the agent model is slightly bigger in terms of states, than the environment. Also, using a
model smaller than the environment still led to a favourable behaviour (associating as many states
as possible) of the Cognitive Body model. Performance degraded badly, when the agent models
grew over twice as big as the environment. The cause of this deterioration in performance was not
investigated.
The experiments also focused on the application of a single learning algorithm, Reward-modulated
Hebbian Learning (Pfeiffer et al. , 2010), primarily because of reducing the possibility of bugs. The
Cognitive Body model itself is agnostic to the kind of learning algorithm used, and even to the
model space which is searched in, as long as the algorithm optimizes the criteria formulated in
Section 2.4. Especially, the Competence models could also learn action sequences instead of single
actions. Suitable implementations could e.g. beRecurrentNeuralNetworks, ormethods of Reservoir
Computing (Jaeger, 2010; Maass et al. , 2002; Lukoševičius & Jaeger, 2009). Other promising venues
of research would be to integrate methods optimizing the scalability by adding and pruning states,
introducing competition between states, or adding elements of unsupervised learning methods to
bootstrap the Cognitive Body model. A candidate hybrid algorithm is the contextual Slow Feature
Analysis algorithm (Deimel, 2009).
Following the empirical research on stability of the Cognitive Body model, it is unclear whether
a hierarchical, stacked model as proposed in Section 2.8 is itself stable. The stacking of another
60
Master Thesis: Making Sense
model on top an already learnt (and stable) one can influence the lower level model by changing
the probability distribution of desired states, and the change of the lower level models can in turn
influence the structure of the upper models. It is unknown whether this interaction is beneficial or
disadvantageous to the performance of the Cognitive Body model.
Due to time constraints, only simulations of virtual environments were conducted. It would also
be prudent to also run experiments with real robots, to see whether the Cognitive Body model also
yields sensible results in really unknown environments.
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A.1 Measures of Similarity in Information Theory
This section explains some basic measures of similarity used in this thesis. All measures can also
be defined for continuous variables, though here, only the definitions for discrete variables are
covered.
Entropy
The information-theoretic Entropy (Shannon Entropy) measures the expected information content
of a signal source or variable. For a discrete variable X with n possible values, and respective
probabilities of occurrence p (X = x), its entropy is defined as:
H (X) =  
X
x2X
p (X = x) log2 p (X = x) (bit)
Properties
An entropy is always positive:
8X : H (X)  0
The highest possible entropy is equal to a uniform distribution Un (over n possible discrete values):
8X : H(Un) = log2 n  H(X)
The lowest possible entropy occurs, when the variable always has a single value:
H(X) = 0
) p (X = xi) =
(
1 i = c
0 i 6= c c 2 [1 : : : n]
Intuitively, a lower Entropy means, that the distribution is less similar to a uniform distribution,
and more predictable.
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Conditional Entropy
Conditional Entropy is defined as the Entropy of variable, given the knowledge of the value of a
second variable. For two discrete variablesX ,Y :
H (Y jX) =
X
x2X;y2Y
p (X=x; Y =y)  log2
p (X=x)
p (X=x; Y =y)
(bit)
Properties
A Conditional Entropy is always positive:
8X;Y : H (Y jX)  0
A conditional Entropy is not commutative:
9X;Y : H (Y jX) 6= H (XjY )
A Conditional Entropy always is bounded by the Entropy of the conditioned variable:
8X;Y : H (Y jX)  H (Y )
Kullback-Leibler Divergence
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence is a widely used measure of difference between two probability




P (i) log P (i)
Q (i)




p (x) log p (x)
q (x)
dx
Where p= dPdx and q= dQdx are the probability densities. Properties important of the KL-Divergence
to subsequent arguments are:
The KL-Divergence always is a positive value:
8P;Q : DKL (PkQ)  0
Zero Divergence means, that distributions are identical.
DKL (PkQ) = 0 ) P = Q
For independent, marginal distributions P1; P2 and Q1; Q2, we can decompose the KL-Divergence
of the joint distributions P1P2 andQ1Q2 into two additive KL-Divergences:
DKL (P1P2kQ1Q2) = DKL (P1kQ1) +DKL (P2kQ2)
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In the special case of P2 = Q1 = H :
DKL (P1HkHQ2) = DKL (P1kH) +DKL (HkQ2)
Iff the distribution P1H is centrally symmetrical (Kotz et al. , 2006), and thus identical toHP1, we can
decompose the KL-Divergence of the left hand-side into:
DKL (P1HkHQ2) = DKL (HP1kHQ2)
= DKL (HkH) +DKL (P1kQ2)
The same decomposition is possible given a centrally symmetricHQ2 :
DKL (P1HkHQ2) = DKL (P1HkQ2H)
= DKL (HkH) +DKL (P1kQ2)
asDKL (HkH) = 0, we can then conclude:
DKL (P1kQ2) = DKL (P1kH) +DKL (HkQ2)
if eitherP1H orQ2H are centrally symmetric distributions. This especially is the case, when either
P1 = H or Q2 = H , i.e. when the respective marginal distributions are identical, irrespective of
their cross-correlation.
Using the assumption of central symmetry, we can compute anupper boundary for bothKL-Divergences
from/to state H, without knowing H:
(P1 = H) _ (Q2 = H)) DKL (P1kH)  DKL (P1kQ2)
DKL (HkQ2)  DKL (P1kQ2) (A.1.1)
Data Processing Inequality
The Data Processing Inequality theorem states, that any transformation of a parametrized distribution
X yielding distribution Y cannot have a higher Ali-Silvey class distancemeasure (e.g. the Information
Distance ID, or Kullback-Leibler-Divergence) with respect to its parameters:
ID (X (1) ; X (2)) > ID (Y (1) ; Y (2))
In a (for the purpose of this thesis)more convenient formof this theorem, it expresses this inequality
with Mutual Information I (; ) in a Bayesian Network. For variables X,Y,Z forming a Markovian
Chain, i.e. when p (x; y; z) = p (x) p (yjx) p (zjy):
.X Y Z
The Data Processing Inequality states, that:
I (X;Y ) > I(X;Z)
I (Z;Y ) > I(X;Z)
In other words, the Mutual Information of variables Y and Z with the original variable X cannot
increase along a chain of transformations.
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APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL TOOLS
A.2 Hinton Diagram
The Hinton diagram is a visual tool to qualitatively asses all elements of a matrix. Here is a simple
example:
• the area of the squares equals the absolute value of the relatedmatrix element, relative to the
biggest element.
• white squares indicate positive, black squares indicate negative element values
Additionally„ when statistical averages over several matrices are computed in this thesis, the con-
trast to the background colour is used to code for certainty. The transparency  2 [0:0 : : : 1:0] of a
square relates to the standard deviation  of element aij :
 = e (aij)
Therefore, opaque squares indicate certain, stable weights, whereas translucent squares indicate
strongly fluctuating weight values.
A.3 Properties of Functions
For analytical evaluation, two basic properties of functions (associating elements from domain to
co-domain) are of importance: Surjectivity and Injectivity. If a function between a domain and a
co-domain is both surjective and injective, it is said to be bijective.
Surjective Function
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A surjective function implies, that all values of the target domain can occur.
In the context of the Cognitive Bodymodel, the existence of a surjectivemap from environmental to
agent states implies that every agent state has (at least one) specific environmental state associated
with it, and thus is semantically grounded, or associated with this state. Likewise, unassociated states
are therefore not (yet) bound to a certain set of environmental states.
Injective Function










An injective function implies, that all elements of the co-domain uniquely distinguish elements of
the domain, i.e. that an inequality relation in the co-domain also holds true in the target domain.
In the context of the Cognitive Body model, the existence of an injective map from environmental
to agent states implies, that the maximum possible separation of environmental states has been
attained, and no information about them is lost.
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The thesis Making Sense derives principles for an autonomous cognitive apparatus (being a physical
part of an agent), to enable it to transparently access features of the agent’s physical body and
environment. It regards action and observation to be aspects of fundamentally the same process
that enables an agent to define itself. This process is shaped not only by the brain, but also the
sensorimotor contingencies of the somewhat arbitrary, “attached” environment.
The presented Cognitive Body model formulates a framework for structuring the interactions of an
agent into the manipulation and observation of hidden environmental states. It is agnostic to
the type of learning algorithms used, but formulates the constraint of an invariant causal chain to
create accessible approximations (and ideally copies) of the hidden, inaccessible, environmental
state within the agent’s cognitive apparatus (i.e. its brain). This is done by incorporating both
acting and sensing as indispensable processes. It is closely related to and inspired by the concept of
sensorimotor contingencies (Philipona et al. , 2003).
To formulate the approximation process, Making Sense utilizes two complementary but incompat-
ible points of view. Borrowing from philosophical Constructivism, a first person view is assumed,
complementary to the objective third person view of hard sciences. Learning is conceived as making
the behaviour of constructedUmwelt and physical environment (including an agents physical body)
similar.
In a series of exploratory simulations, the Cognitive Body model is then applied to make an agent
learn to control a hidden environmental state. The state is not directly accessible via the agents
signals, but indirectly by controlling a Finite State Machine. The series of simulations explore
a simple yet nontrivial world, and highlight key differences and shared properties between the
Cognitive Body model and the classical models of Reinforcement Learning and Classification, which
are usually used when modelling perception and action independently.
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APPENDIX B. ADDENDUM
B.2 Zusammenfassung in Deutsch
Die Arbeit Making Sense leitet Prinzipien für autonome kognitive Apparate (als Teil eines Agenten)
her,mitHilfe dererMerkmale des physischenKörpers des Agenten unddessen unmittelbarerUmge-
bung transparent zugegriffenwerden können. Die Arbeit sieht Handeln und Beobachten als Aspekte
eines grundsätzlichen Prozesses, der Agenten ermöglicht, sich selbst zu definieren. Dieser Prozess
wird nicht nur durch das Gehirn, sondern auch durch die sensorimotorischenMöglichkeiten der im
Grunde beliebigen Umgebung geformt.
Das präsentierte Cognitive BodyModell stellt einen Rahmen dar, um Interaktionen des Agentenmit-
tels Manipulation und Beobachtung versteckter Umgebungszustände zu beschreiben. Es ist grund-
sätzlich blind gegenüber der Art der tatsächlich eingesetzten Lernalgorithmen, setzt aber die Bedin-
gung der invarianten Kausalkette, um innerhalb des Agenten (in seinemGehirn) zugreifbareNäherun-
gen (idealerweise Kopien) versteckter Umgebungszustände zu erzeugen. Erreicht wird dies durch
Einbeziehung sowohl des Handelns als auch des Beobachtens als dafür unerlässliche Vorgänge. Eng
verwandt dazu ist das Konzept der sensorimotor contingencies (Philipona et al. , 2003), welches die
Arbeit auch inspiriert hat.
Um das Verfahren zur Näherung zu beschreiben, verwendet die Arbeit zwei komplementäre, aber
nicht vereinbare Sichtweisen. Die Sichtweise aus erster Person ist dem philosophischen Konstruktivis-
mus entlehnt, als Ergänzung zu der in den Naturwissenschaften verwendeten objektiven Sichtweise
aus dritter Person. In diesem Kontext wird Lernen als ähnlich machen des Verhaltens von konstru-
ierter Umwelt und objektiver Umgebung (die den physischen Körper einschließt) aufgefasst.
In einer Serie von Simulationen wird das Cognitive Body Modell angewendet, damit ein Agent die
Kontrolle über einen versteckten Umgebungszustand erlernen kann. Der Agent kann über seine
gegebenen Signale nicht direkt auf den Zustand zugreifen, allerdings kann er es indirekt durch
Kontrolle eines endlichen Automaten. Die Simulationsserie untersucht eine einfache, aber nicht
triviale Welt, um wichtige Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten des Cognitive Body Modells mit dem
herkömmlichen Modellen , in welchen Wahrnehmung und Handeln getrennt modelliert wird (Rein-
forcement Learning und Klassifizierung), heraus zu arbeiten.
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